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Clarifying Stereotyping
Kerri Lynn Stone
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2009, New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd
wrote a scathing, sardonic, insightful account of Sarah Palin's
announcement of her decision to step down as Alaska's Governor.' The
depiction of the Governor by Ms. Dowd dripped with the columnist's
trademark descriptive, but acerbic, narrative, with lines like: "On the
shore of Lake Lucille, with wild fowl honking and the First Dude
smiling,.. . the woman who took the Republican Party by storm only 10
months ago gave an incoherent, breathless and prickly stream of
consciousness to a small group in her Wasilla yard."2  Ms. Dowd's
rendition of the actual announcement, however, was even more pungent,
capturing her view of Governor Palin's persona, character, and
capabilities in rich, descriptive terms: "After girlish burbling about how
'progressing our state,' and serving Alaska 'is the greatest honor that I
could imagine,' and raving about how much she loves her job, she
abruptly announced that she was making the ultimate sacrifice: dumping
the state on her lieutenant."3
Ms. Dowd's vivid, if slanted, depiction of Governor Palin as
engaging in "girlish" chatter likely is not offensive to her readership. In
fact, it is likely that most of her readers, if asked, would say that they
found the term clearly descriptive-evocative, in fact, of a very specific
and precise shading of a characteristic. The word, used in any context,
and whether used by a woman, about a woman, or, as here, both, has a
relatively clear and understood meaning.
. Associate Professor, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. I would like to thank
Professors Michael Zimmer, Joelle Moreno, and Matthew Mirow for their insightful comments. I
would also like to thank my research assistants, David Mark, Chelsea Moore, Elizabeth Rea, and
Dannette Willory.
1. Maureen Dowd, Now, Sarah's Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2009, at L9.
2. Id
3. Id.
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Antidiscrimination law, however, indicates that sex stereotyping that
leads to adverse employment actions is unlawful. Is it gender
discrimination, and thus illegal, to fire someone whose employment is at-
will for being too "girlish," or is it a legitimate character preference
protected by law?
People make comments all the time that include or invoke
stereotypes. Sometimes those comments are indicative of their belief
systems or values. Sometimes they are feeble-or genuine-attempts at
humor or wit. Sometimes people speak rashly and in anger. Many
times, people are misunderstood, and their true feelings are belied by a
clumsy choice of words. Much of the law of employment discrimination
necessarily implicates a searching probe into the often undisclosed-
sometimes even to oneself-motivations, beliefs, and intentions that
underlie and impel acts alleged to have been discriminatorily premised
on someone's race, gender, or other protected class status. Rarely in this
day and age does one who suspects that discrimination has befallen him
have a "smoking gun"4 or an admission to that effect. Generally, the
undisclosed mindset of a discriminatory decision-maker, far from a
simple hidden secret, is actually a complex tapestry of unvoiced beliefs,
assumptions, and associations. This tapestry, a victim of discrimination
soon realizes, is typically too tightly woven to easily extricate the
needed, discrete strand of thought that shows a predisposition to see or
judge certain groups differently.
This Article addresses the largely undefined, misunderstood-yet-
often-resorted-to concept of "stereotyping" as a basis for, or sufficient
evidence of, liability for employment discrimination. Since the
concept's genesis in Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1989,5 plaintiffs
have proffered remarks alleged to be tinged with, or indicating the
presence of, impermissible stereotypes as evidence of discrimination
based on protected-class status-be that sex, race, color, religion, or
national origin-in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'
4. So-called "smoking gun" evidence has been defined as "the crucial piece of evidence." See
WILLIAM SAFIRE, ON LANGUAGE 263 (1980); WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY
661 (1978) (defining "smoking gun" as "incontrovertible evidence; the proof of guilt that
precipitates resignations" and also stating that "[s]uch a stance is generally considered suggestive of
obvious ... guilt").
5. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
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Courts, however, guided only by the original Supreme Court case
about stereotyping-Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,7  which is
ubiquitously invoked, but unclear-have come up short in their
adjudication of these cases. Courts have failed to engage with the
threshold questions of what it means to "stereotype," how stereotyping
translates into impermissible action, and why stereotyping is considered
nefarious and capable of fomenting discrimination. Taking it upon
themselves to discern those instances in which an allegedly stereotyped
comment fails as a matter of law to evince the decision-maker's intent
that a plaintiff must establish, courts have all too often erred on the side
of foreclosing claims at the summary judgment stage because of their
limited, subjective understanding of what the words meant.
A court interpreting the words that one chooses, as well as their
context and intonation, and concluding-as a matter of law-that the
speaker could not possibly harbor the alleged animus or prejudice, would
seem to supply an answer to the ultimate question of fact. To the extent
that a single comment is alleged to evince a mindset of prejudice,
discrimination, or even that the speaker harbored subconscious or
unconscious beliefs about a class, engendering discrimination, at what
point may a court conclude that, as a matter of law, this is not the case?
Phrased differently, at what point may a trier of law conclude that a
decision-maker misspoke? Is what was said what the speaker really
meant? Does the comment evince a discriminatory mindset? These are
just a few of the questions that courts must ask when they attempt to
interpret stereotyped comments as they decide whether to grant summary
judgment on the claim.
This Article examines the language in Hopkins and its precise
mandates and guidance for lower courts. It then explains the widespread
extrapolation of Hopkins by lower courts and the framework in which the
case now operates. This Article posits that Hopkins furnished guidance
that is less than clear as to when so-called "stereotyping" is evidence that
warrants evaluation by a trier of fact and when a comment is harmless or
too attenuated from an adverse action to permit an allegation of
discrimination to survive. The Article also identifies the various smaller,
often unarticulated questions bound up in the larger issues of when
impermissible stereotyping has occurred and how various courts' failures
to specify these questions and their answers may have led to the confused
state of stereotyping jurisprudence.
7. 490 U.S. 228.
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Next, this Article submits that there are two primary reasons why
stereotyped comments and beliefs may be pernicious in the workplace.
By dismantling the pat notion that "stereotypes are bad" and breaking out
the various ways in which stereotypes can evince discrimination, a
clearer view of when stereotyped remarks should be said to create triable
issues of fact begins to emerge.
Why are stereotypes harmful? First, where stereotyped comments
evince a belief about a group and the speaker's predisposition towards
viewing the group through a certain lens, they evince a discriminatory
intent or state of mind that typically ought to be evaluated by a trier of
fact against the backdrop of the alleged discrimination at issue, and that
should preclude summary judgment. Second, irrespective of whether
animus is expressed toward a group, where the stereotype is expressed as
an intragroup critique that an individual is too much like or not enough
like the stereotype for her group, a predisposition to hold group members
to different standards and thus to treat them differently because of their
protected-class status, is belied. This includes, for example, statements
that a woman is too girly or not feminine enough, or that an Asian
American does not work as hard as expected. These statements, too,
should operate to preclude summary judgment when they are exposed.
The problem with Hopkins, the ubiquitous case resorted to by
virtually every court with so-called stereotyping claims, is that its unique
facts showed that both intergroup animus-comments directed against
the plaintiff because she was a woman-and intragroup preferences-
comments seeming to disfavor the plaintiff for being the "wrong type" of
woman-were at work. This fact, as will be shown, served to obscure
the rationale for the Court's vigilance when it came to stereotypes and
the reasons why and instances in which future courts should take
allegedly stereotyped comments and hold that they are evidence of
intentional discrimination that should permit a plaintiffs case to survive
summary judgment.
This Article thus aims to dispel the myth, propagated in part by
courts' misreading of Hopkins, that there is such a discrete cause of
action as "stereotyping." At the same time, it reviews the myriad of
cases that have tried to decide, as a matter of law, when a stereotyped
comment sufficed to create an issue of fact as to intentional
discrimination and breaks down this complex question. Courts appear to
have no real uniform standard for evaluating when a statement alleged to
have stereotyped a plaintiff is probative and when it can only reasonably
be seen as a misspeak, a mistake, or otherwise too "stray" to suffice as
evidence that impermissible discrimination took place.
594 [Vol. 59
CLARIFYING STEREOTYPING
II. PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS & STEREOTYPING
Consider the following two cases, each of which involves a male
plaintiff alleging that he has been the victim of impermissible sex
stereotyping in contravention of Title VII. Both cases' opinions invoke
the 1989 Supreme Court case of Hopkins, which held: "In the specific
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on
the basis of gender."8  In Hopkins, a large accounting firm rejected a
female candidate for partnership because, according to the decision-
makers, her demeanor, appearance, and interactions with others did not
comport with the ways in which they felt a woman should look, act, and
appear.9
A. Sassaman
In a 2009 Second Circuit case, the plaintiff, who worked for the
Dutchess County Board of Elections in New York, became embroiled in
a sexual harassment investigation after a series of interactions with a
female coworker resulted in a disputed charge levied against him.io
After being told that he must either resign or he would be fired, the
plaintiff was then told that the decision-maker did not feel that he had
"any choice" because the plaintiffs accuser knew many attorneys and
the decision-maker feared being sued." The decision-maker, a male,
then added, "'And besides you probably did what she said you did
because you're male and nobody would believe you anyway."'l 2
Fearing that he had no other option, the plaintiff resigned and sued
his employer under Title VII, alleging gender discrimination. 3  The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
declining to "attach any real significance" to the statement made about
the plaintiff being male, and dismissing it as "stray," "ambigu[ous]," and
8. Id. at 250.
9. Id. at 235. Partners at the company described Hopkins as "macho," claiming that she
"overcompensated for being a woman," and advised her on one occasion to take "a course in charm
school." Id. Other partners took offense to some of the language that Hopkins used because it was
spoken by a female. Id. Another suggested to Hopkins that for her to improve her chances of
becoming partner, she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id.
10. Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 310-11 (2d Cir. 2009).
11. Id. at 311.
12. Id.
13. Id.
2011] 595
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"incapable of 'demonstrat[ing] actionable gender stereotyping"' so as to
establish that the plaintiff was acted against under circumstances
engendering an inference of discriminatory intent, an element of his
prima facie case. 14 The court held that "such a viewpoint, even if held,
would [not] necessarily taint an employment decision to respond to a
harassment complaint."' 5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, found that a
reasonable trier might "construe this statement as an invidious sex
stereotype" and called the sex stereotyping in the statement "more overt"
than that which occurred in Hopkins.16 According to the court, because
the decision-maker justified his termination decision "by pointing to the
propensity of men, as a group, to sexually harass women"-thus
impermissibly relying upon a gender-based stereotype-he created a
reasonable inference that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was
motivated by a discriminatory intent.17 Despite the defendants' attempt
to characterize the remark as stray, an aside, or even as having been
made after the fact and only in reference to "what others may think," the
court maintained that in the context of a motion for summary judgment,
18the remark served to create a triable issue as to discriminatory intent.
B. Lautermilch
The plaintiff in a 2003 Sixth Circuit case, an at-will substitute
teacher named Lautermilch, was told that he would no longer receive
calls to work in his school after the principal and assistant principal
voiced concerns that he had been "acting inappropriately with young
people, tutoring a female student at his home, telling inappropriate jokes
in the classroom, and commenting on the size of a female teacher's
breasts," as well as allegations that he made a lewd comment to a
student.19 The plaintiff claimed that the principal called him "too
macho" and "spit the word macho out as if it was distasteful."20
14. Id
15. Id at 312.
16. Id. at 312-13.
17. Id at 313 ("[C]omments made about a woman's inability to combine work and motherhood
constitutes sex stereotyping that provides evidence of discriminatory intent." (citing Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004))).
18. Id
19. Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2003).
20. Id at 274.
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The majority stated that the plaintiff was making a futile attempt to
"hang his entire prima facie case on one offhand comment." 2 1  It
concluded that the comment did not compel the conclusion that
"unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer's actions" and subsequently granted summary judgment in the
case due to the plaintiffs inability to state a prima facie claim.22 The
court concluded: "Specifically, when the comment is placed in the
context of the termination hearing documenting specific allegations of
misconduct, any reasonable trier of fact would conclude that the
comment was critical of [the plaintiffs] behavior, not his sex or
gender." 23
The dissent, however, concluded that the "comment that Lautermilch
was 'too macho,' made at the time she informed him of the decision to
deny him future opportunities as a substitute teacher, constitutes direct
evidence of sex discrimination sufficient to defeat the Schools' motion
for summary judgment." 24  According to the dissent, the majority's
mistake was "ignor[ing] the key fact that the 'too macho' comment was
made by the decision-maker at the termination hearing."25 The dissent
went on to explain that "the commonplace usage of the word 'macho'
refers exclusively to behaviors or qualities associated with the male
gender." 26 Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could easily find that "[b]oth
the nature of the comment and the manner in which it was delivered
suggest that summary judgment was improper because a reasonable juror
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Lautermilch's gender
was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions."27 The dissent
went to the definition of macho, which means, among other things,
exhibiting aggressive manliness and assertive virility.2 8
"Suppose," the dissent asked, the principal "had said to an African-
American substitute teacher that the Schools were unable to utilize his
services because he was 'too black,' or that [the principal] had failed to
employ a particular female teacher because she was 'too feminine."' 29
Pursuant to Hopkins, it contended, "[u]nder these circumstances it is
21. Id at 276.
22. Id
23. Id.
24. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 277.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
2011] 597
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relatively clear that the majority would have reached a different result." 30
Moreover, "[t]he Principal's word choice, telling [the plaintiff] that he
would not be rehired as a substitute teacher because he was 'too macho,'
as opposed to telling him he was 'too male,' should not be the basis for a
different finding."3 1
The dissent pointed out that both the plaintiff and Ann Hopkins were
characterized as acting too much like men, rendering the situation
"directly analogous" to one in which a man and a woman are accused of
behaving too effeminately.32 The distinction, according to the dissent,
was that Ann Hopkins was accused of not acting enough like a member
of her sex, and the plaintiff was accused of acting too much like a
member of his.33 The dissent concluded: "Because . . . it is inconsistent
to protect a woman from discrimination on the basis that she is not acting
'like a woman' or conversely acts 'too much like a woman,' while failing
to protect a man accused of acting 'too manly,"' summary judgment was
improvidently granted, and "[u]nder either scenario the plaintiff is
suffering sex discrimination by the application of harmful gender
stereotypes."34
Aside from their invocations of Hopkins, these two cases, Sassaman
and Lautermilch, have several things in common. Both involve male
plaintiffs alleging impermissible sex stereotyping in violation of Title
VII. In each case, at least one opinion supporting each side's stance on
summary judgment was published. In each case, the argument could be
made that the employer took the plaintiffs gender into account in the
course of an adverse employment decision. Similarly, in each case, the
argument could be made that but for the inartful wording of an off-
handed comment, gender was not a factor in the adverse action at all.
These cases differ in several key respects as well. The most notable
difference between them is that the plaintiff in Sassaman ultimately
succeeded in defeating the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
while the plaintiff in Lautermilch did not. They also differ in that the
plaintiff in Sassaman was stereotyped in such a way as to indict his
entire gender; as a man embroiled in a sexual harassment investigation,
he was doomed to be viewed negatively, precisely because of his sex,
and for no other reason, according to the comment. The plaintiff in
Lautermilch, however, was not stereotyped by virtue of the fact that he
30. Id. at 278.
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id
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was a man but rather for being the wrong kind of man-too "manly" in
his behavior. Do these differences matter? Should they?
An examination of these cases reveals the murkiness of the Hopkins
opinion and the reach of its guidance. Indeed, Hopkins has been cited in
a one-size-fits-all manner in virtually every case brought under Title VII
in which stereotyping of any kind or in any context has been alleged.35
The actual diversity of "stereotyping" claims, as well as their pathologies
and anatomies, has not been fully explored or correlated with their proper
relationship to Hopkins or outcomes. A close analysis of the various
opinions in these two cases, however, reveals several things.
In the first place, it reveals the many questions actually bound up in
the singular question of Hopkins's applicability and, ultimately, in
whether it may be said, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff cannot make
out a case of sex discrimination in whole or in part through sex
stereotyping. In the second place, the Supreme Court gave poor
guidance as to how to analyze stereotypes as evidence, leading to a
legacy of inconsistency in lower courts' determinations as to when an
allegation of discrimination supported by a claim of stereotyping should
reach a trier of fact. Looking first at Sassaman, what did the district
court mean when it dismissed the comment at issue as "stray" and
ambiguous? Did the court believe that the speaker misspoke? Perhaps it
believed that the speaker actually felt that, as the man in a he-said-she-
said situation, the plaintiff would not be believed. Maybe, however, the
court thought the plaintiffs lack of credibility alone provided an ample
basis upon which to act without veering into a Title VII problem. Did
the court think that the speaker actually believed that the plaintiff was
guilty of sexual harassment and that this belief, irrespective of the basis
of the belief, was a sufficient basis upon which to terminate the plaintiff
without running afoul of Title VII? Or maybe the term stray referred to
the court's belief that the whole comment was an afterthought, stupidly
voiced after a legitimate decision that did not contemplate gender had
been reached. While the district court denied that the comment could, as
a matter of law, ever amount to actionable gender stereotyping, the court
of appeals found that Hopkins not only applied but that its facts were less
"overt" than the comment at issue. Many questions surround this
35. Although Hopkins has been used where stereotyping claims are raised against the backdrops
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2006), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006), this Article will only discuss Hopkins's application in
Title VII cases. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (holding that the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion in his ADEA claim should not be the standard that was set forth in
Hopkins).
5992011]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
disparity in viewpoints and the case in general as Hopkins applies to it
and ought to predicate its outcome.
If the defendants were genuinely worried about a sexual harassment
lawsuit, or more simply, if they did not believe the plaintiffs version of
events, did they not have a right to fire the plaintiff?3 Would not such a
firing, just or not, still be permissible so long as it was not, in fact,
because of the plaintiffs sex?37 To the extent that the remark was made
in jest, frustration, or otherwise absent any intent other than to avoid a
lawsuit, should it be read in context, as the district court read it, or was
Hopkins properly implicated? The court of appeals noted that although
the defendants could not be seen as having condoned or overlooked an
instance of harassment, the "fear of a lawsuit does not justify an
employer's reliance on sex stereotypes to resolve allegations of sexual
harassment, discriminating against the accused employee in the
process."38
Turning to Lautermilch, one could similarly ask whether what may
be termed a simple misspeak, or poor word choice, was poised to buttress
a claim of sex-based discrimination when such discrimination simply
was not present. 3 9  Again, two sets of judges disputed the issue of
whether the case could be disposed of as a matter of law without resort to
a trier of fact.4 0 As in Sassaman, was there an ample basis for the
employment action without reverting to the unfortunate characterization
of the plaintiff, and if so, should that operate to dispose of the matter?
Once again, how ought Hopkins and its mandate have been applied to the
case? The majority found that the "offhand[ed]," "macho" comment
was, indeed, virtually irrelevant to the decision to fire the plaintiff, in
light of the facts surrounding his termination.4 1 On the other hand, the
dissent found Hopkins directly on point, dictating a denial of summary
judgment.42
Insofar as protected class stereotypes operate to influence the way in
which a decision-maker views, treats, and ultimately disadvantages a
plaintiff, evidence of such an occurrence should suffice as proof of
36. See Patrick S. Shin, Vive la Diffdrence? A Critical Analysis of the Justification of Sex-
Dependent Workplace Restrictions on Dress and Grooming, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 491,
491-92 (2007).
37. See id.
38. Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2009).
39. See Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 2003).
40. Id at 276-78.
41. Id. at 276.
42. Id at 277-78.
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invidious intent.43 Similarly, when a trier of fact finds the utterance of an
allegedly stereotyped remark to be wholly nonindicative of
discriminatory intent, it must be disregarded."
However, scholars in law and other disciplines have pointed to the
existence of subconscious and unconscious biases, belied, perhaps, by
seemingly "stray" comments.45 Moreover, the "mixed motive" theory of
a case, ironically unveiled in Hopkins, dictates that a court must also look
beyond the existence of a legal reason for a decision-maker's action to
see if invidious, class-based discrimination on any level underlies the
decision.46 The case law, however, cites to Hopkins virtually each time a
plaintiff alleges any kind of "stereotype" in a Title VII case. When
examined, the resulting opinions are as divergent as those in Sassaman
and Lautennilch.47 Should courts have different tools, or at least a
different gloss, based upon certain factors, including the type of
stereotyping being alleged (inter or intragroup), how tacit or explicit the
alleged stereotype is, or what legitimate reasons may exist for the
adverse action at issue? Should it matter if the allegation is of
harassment, rather than a tangible employment action? At the end of the
day, was what happened in Sassaman all that different from what
happened in Lautermilch? Was the scenario in that case all that different
from Hopkins?
After twenty years of indiscriminate citation in virtually every Title
VII "stereotyping" case brought, Hopkins is proving inadequate to
grapple with the complex determinations necessitated by the nuanced
and complex modem world of workplace discrimination. This world is
replete with inartful word choices, biases that exist on multiple levels of
consciousness, and intragroup discrimination that might permit one with
class-based biases and prejudices to select those within a group that are
least objectionable to him and still stay within the purview of the law.
The one-size-fits-all approach to Hopkins's application can no longer be
sustained by a body of law overrun with divergent opinions and
inconsistent, often-unarticulated rationales as to why certain behavior
43. See Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1293 (2008).
44. See Lautermilch, 314 F.3d at 276.
45. See Albiston et al., supra note 43, at 1293-96.
46. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-42 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Lanahan v. S. Nev. Health Dist., No. 2:06CV-01 176-LRH-LRL, 2009 WL
395794, at *1-2, 7 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2009) (holding that defendant's comments that "[w]omen are
good for only one thing and that is sex" and that old employees were "too old to do their jobs well
anymore" were sufficient for the plaintiffs claims to survive summary judgment on the basis of
gender and age discrimination).
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will allow some, but not others, to elude liability. A reexamination of
Hopkins is necessary.
C. What exactly did Hopkins say?
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an "unlawful
employment practice for an employer .. . to discriminate against any
individual . .. because of.. . sex.", 8  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
the Supreme Court addressed itself to the issue of an employer having
multiple motives, some legal and some illegal, for taking an employment
action against an employee. 4 9  Hopkins also addressed the issue of
stereotyping as a means through which a decision-maker may exhibit or
manifest his disparate treatment of an employee "because of. . . sex."5 o
A court can decide Title VII claims under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework." Under this framework, the plaintiff sets
forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,
and then the burden ultimately returns to the plaintiff to persuade the trier
of fact that the defendant's reason was pretextual and that discrimination
motivated the employer.52 In Hopkins, however, the Supreme Court
announced that an employee may show that an employment decision was
made for both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, and Congress largely
codified this mixed-motives theory in the Civil Rights Act of 199 15
A reexamination of the facts and language of Hopkins seems useful.
Ann Hopkins was a candidate for partnership at Price Waterhouse in
1982.54 Her success in this pursuit was dependent on the results of
written comments submitted by partners in the firm.55  Of the eighty-
eight individuals proposed for partner, forty-seven were made partners,
twenty-one were rejected, and twenty were placed on "hold" for
reconsideration to be made the following year.S6 Hopkins was among
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
49. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239-42.
50. Id. at 250-52.
51. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.").
54. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 231.
55. Id. at 232.
56. Id. at 233.
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those "held."5 7 In Hopkins's particular case, thirteen of the thirty-two
partners who made written comments on her candidacy wrote in support
of it, eight recommended that she be rejected, another eight wrote that
they did not have an informed opinion on the matter, and three
recommended that she be placed on hold.ss Before any reconsideration
of her candidacy, two partners withdrew their support of her candidacy,
and the partnership informed her the reconsideration would not occur.
She subsequently resigned.6 0
At first blush, the reason for Hopkins's failed candidacy was clear.61
By all accounts, her interpersonal skills were found wanting by the
partnership.62 As the Supreme Court stated:
On too many occasions ... Hopkins' aggressiveness . . . spilled over
into abrasiveness. Staff members seem to have borne the brunt of [her]
brusqueness. Long before her bid for partnership, partners evaluating
her work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff
members. Although later evaluations indicate an improvement, [her]
perceived shortcomings in this important area eventually doomed her
bid for partnership. Virtually all of the partners' negative remarks
about Hopkins-even those of partners supporting her-had to do with
her "interpersonal skills." Both "[s]upporters and opponents of her
candidacy ... indicated that she was sometimes overly a ressive,
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff."
There was, however, more to this case than met the eye, and it
appears as though the compelling factual circumstances surrounding
Hopkins's candidacy and evaluation impelled the Supreme Court to
discern that Price Waterhouse had run afoul of Title VII.64 In the first
place, at the time of Hopkins's candidacy, Price Waterhouse had 662
partners nationwide, seven of whom were women.s Moreover, although
eighty-eight individuals were proposed for partnership that year, Hopkins
was the only female among them.66
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 233 n.1.
60. Id.
61. Id at 234-35.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. See id. at 258.
65. Id. at 233.
66. Id.
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In the second place, by most accounts and objective measurements of
success, Hopkins appeared to be the ideal partner. 7 In fact, the Supreme
Court recited that partners from her office, "[i]n a jointly prepared
statement supporting her candidacy, . . . showcased her successful 2-year
effort to secure a $25 million contract with the Department of State,
labeling it 'an outstanding performance' and one that Hopkins carried out
'virtually at the partner level."' 6 8 This joint statement described Hopkins
as "'an outstanding professional"' with a "deft touch, strong character,
independence and integrity."69 Indeed, as the Court pointed out, even the
district judge assigned to Hopkins's case found that she had "'played a
key role in Price Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million
dollar contract with the Department of State"' and that "'[n]one of the
other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a
comparable record in terms of successfully securing major contracts for
the partnership."' 70  The judge also found that Hopkins "'had no
difficulty dealing with clients and her clients appear to have been very
pleased with her work' and that she 'was generally viewed as a highly
competent project leader who worked long hours, pushed vigorously to
meet deadlines and demanded much from the multidisciplinary staffs
with which she worked.' 7  The Supreme Court also cited the testimony
of a State Department official who had been a client of Hopkins, stating
that she was "extremely competent, intelligent, strong and forthright,
very productive, energetic and creative." 7 2  "Another high-ranking
official praised Hopkins's decisiveness, broadmindedness, and
'intellectual clarity."' 73
Finally, and perhaps most fatal to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme
Court found that "[t]here were clear signs . .. that some of the partners
reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a woman." 74
For example,
[o]ne partner described her as "macho"; another suggested that she
"overcompensated for being a woman"; a third advised her to take "a
course at charm school." Several partners criticized her use of
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners
67. Id. at 233-34.
68. Id. at 233.
69. Id. at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 235.
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objected to her swearing only "because it's a lady using foul
language.". . . Another supporter explained that Hopkins "ha[d]
matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr
[sic] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr
[sic] candidate.". . . But it was the man who ... bore responsibility for
explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to
place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order
to improve her chances for partnership, [he] advised, Hopkins should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."7 5
Moreover, the district court found past female partner candidates had
"been evaluated in sex-based terms." 76  The confluence of the above
factors was simply too much for the Supreme Court to ignore. However,
it almost painted itself into a proverbial corner when it conceded that
"Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its
partnership decisions"7 7 and that, indeed, "Hopkins' conduct justified
complaints about her behavior as a senior manager."78
Expert testimony provided the court a way out of the proverbial
corner. The testimony of a renowned social psychologist "that the
partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced
by sex stereotyping buttressed the plaintiffs theory." 79 According to the
expert, the confluence of factors discussed above led to the inexorable
conclusion that sex stereotyping had infiltrated the decision-making
process: "Hopkins' uniqueness (as the only woman in the pool of
candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that
sharply critical remarks such as these were the product of sex
stereotyping. ... "
It is important to review the precise derivation and wording of the
Court's theory promulgated about sex stereotyping and Title VII liability.
Specifically, the Court explained that, "[i]n the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
75. Id.
76. Id. at 236.
77. Id.
78. Id at 258.
79. Id. at 235 (noting the defendant's objections to the expert and her testimony-namely that
her testimony amounted to "'gossamer evidence' based only on 'intuitive hunches"' and that "her
detection of sex stereotyping [wias 'intuitively divined"'-came too late and declining to discount
her testimony or take issue with her expertise); cf Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of
Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L.
REv. 37, 40-41 (2009) (explaining expert testimony and its role in employment discrimination
litigation, focusing on expert testimony in class-action suits).
80. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 236.
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cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender."8 1 The Court also explicitly rejected both the suggestion that sex
stereotyping did not occur in Hopkins's case-because the partners'
comments evinced it-and the suggestion that sex stereotyping "lacks
legal relevance." 8 2  Noting that "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group," the Court
emphasized that Congress's intent in enacting Title VII was to "strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes."83 Thus, the Court observed: "An employer who
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait
places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job
if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind." 84
The Court, however, noted workplace comments predicated on sex
stereotyping "do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a
particular employment decision."85 Rather, the Court found the plaintiff
bore the burden of demonstrating that her employer "actually relied on
her gender in making its decision."86 While stereotyped remarks could
evince that gender played a role in the decision, the Court believed the
case involved more than stray remarks. Rather,
Hopkins proved that Price Waterhouse invited partners to submit
comments; that some of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes;
that an important part of the Policy Board's decision on Hopkins was
an assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price Waterhouse
in no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked evaluations.87
The Court thus expressly countered Price Waterhouse's assertion that all
Hopkins could demonstrate, at best, was "discrimination in the air.,8 8
Instead, the Court deemed it "'discrimination brought to ground and
visited upon an employee.'"
81. Id at 250.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 251.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id; see also Barbano v. Madison Cnty., 922 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1990) (declaring that
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that gender played a role in an employment decision).
87. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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The Court, however, was not as clear as might be imagined as to the
legal doctrine of stereotyping and its contours generally. On one hand, it
said that the fact that the case before it was strong did not induce it to
place limits on the "possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a
motivating role in an employment decision" and expressly declined to
"decid[e] here which specific facts, 'standing alone,' would or would not
establish a plaintiffs case." 90 Moreover, the Court was careful to note:
"We have not in the past required women whose gender has proved
relevant to an employment decision to establish the negative proposition
that they would not have been subject to that decision had they been
men, and we do not do so today." 91
The Court gave even less clear guidance as to how courts should go
about discerning illicit stereotyping that could make employers run afoul
of the law. Noting that in the case before it, the expert testimony on
stereotyping was "merely icing on Hopkins' cake,"92 the Court took a
we'll-know-it-when-we-see-it approach to sex stereotyping:
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description
of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at charm
school." Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice to
Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an
employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be corrected by a soft-
hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the empoyee's sex
and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.
As to Price Waterhouse's contention that Hopkins could not
demonstrate that "sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to place
her candidacy on hold," the Court reiterated that Hopkins had
demonstrated what she needed to demonstrate:
[The] partnership solicited evaluations from all of the firm's partners;
that it generally relied very heavily on such evaluations in making its
decision; that some of the partners' comments were the product of
stereotyping; and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those
particular comments, either in Hopkins' case or in the past.94
90. Id. at 251-52.
91. Id at 248.
92. Id. at 256.
93. Id
94. Id
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Thus, the Court deduced that the decision-making board took the
comments "motivated by stereotypical notions about women's proper
deportment" into account as it arrived at its decision.95
Generally, then, the Court concluded:
[E]ven if we knew that Hopkins had "personality problems," this would
not tell us that the partners who cast their evaluations of Hopkins in
sex-based terms would have criticized her as sharply (or criticized her
at all) if she had been a man. ... We sit not to determine whether Ms.
Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the partners reacted negatively
to her personality because she is a woman.
This was the extent of the Hopkins Court's guidance on the issue of
stereotyping. The Court left the lower courts the task of infusing its
words with additional meaning. 97
D. Strictures Put on the Stereotyping Doctrine in the Wake of Hopkins
Two years after Hopkins, in McCarthy v. Kemper Life Insurance
Cos., the plaintiff sued his employer for racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII.98 As evidence, he proffered what the Seventh Circuit called
"stereotyped anti-black remarks" made by his coworkers.99 The Seventh
Circuit, however, found that because the plaintiff could not show that the
comments at issue bore any relation to the adverse employment action at
issue-the plaintiffs discharge-they could not serve as evidence of
discriminatory discharge. 00 "While racial slurs are always deplorable,"
the court observed, these comments were not made by decision-makers
and thus could not be used as evidence. 101
Courts initially distinguished between cases in which plaintiffs
proffered "direct evidence" of discriminatory intent and ones in which
they did not. In cases in which the plaintiffs adduced direct evidence,
courts held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis would
not be necessary.102 In such cases, courts have held that the mixed-
motive test, derived from Hopkins, whereby the plaintiff need only
95. Id
96. Id. at 258.
97. Charles Stephen Ralston, Employment Discrimination, 6 TouRo L. REv. 55,93 (1989).
98. 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 686.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 687.
102. See Roberts v. Oklahoma, No. 95-6235, 1997 WL 163524, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997).
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demonstrate that a protected characteristic played a motivating part in the
employment decision, and the employer may try to show that the same
action would have been taken even in the absence of the illegitimate
motive, would apply.103  In cases in which the plaintiffs did not have
direct evidence, the courts forced them to use the McDonnell Douglas
analysis.'1 It quickly became apparent that courts were poised to find
that although a decision-maker had uttered a stereotyped, often revealing
discriminatory remark, little or no weight might be attached to that
remark.'0o
In one early case, the plaintiff successfully adduced evidence that her
division director "was known to believe that certain jobs were more
suitable for women than others" and that he "was widely known to have
ideas about women's place in the workforce."' 06  The plaintiff attempted
to bypass the McDonnell Douglas analysis by arguing that because she
had "direct evidence," the need for the analysis was obviated. 10 7  The
court, however, clarified that she needed to show "direct evidence of
discrimination" in order to take issue with the application of the burden-
shifting framework and not merely "direct evidence of personal bias." 08
Instead, all that the plaintiff had, the court held, was "circumstantial or
indirect evidence, and not direct evidence of discrimination" because she
referenced only "statements" that were "on their face expressions of
103. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in a
mixed-motives case an employer could avoid liability by prevailing on the same-decision defense.
However, in 1991, Congress amended the statute to state that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). The employer may still raise the same-decision defense
to limit the plaintiffs remedies. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The effect of the amendment was to
eliminate the employer's ability to escape liability in Title VII mixed-motive cases by proving that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation. Rather,
through such proof, the employer can now only limit the remedies available to the employee for the
violation.").
104. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Absent direct
evidence of discrimination, claims brought pursuant to Title VII's antidiscrimination provision ...
are subject to the tripartite burden-shifting framework first announced by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas .... " (internal citations omitted)).
105. See Knox v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 909 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ("Evidence
of a decision maker's occasional or sporadic use of stereotyped remarks or derogatory comments
about an employee's age or race is generally insufficient, without more, to establish a violation of
Title VII.. . .").
106. Ramsey v. City of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1990).
107. See id.
108. Id. ("Abhorrent as Brown's private opinions might be, they do not constitute direct evidence
of discriminatory conduct.").
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Brown's personal opinion, and not an existing policy which itself
constitutes discrimination."'o9
Subsequent courts dealing with stereotyped comments alleged to be
indicative of class-based disparate treatment persisted in bifurcating the
paths to a plaintiffs proof into roads of direct evidence and indirect
evidence. Courts struggled, however, with the lack of clear guidance as
to what constituted direct evidence, some noting with some amusement
that "[t]he Supreme Court has defined direct evidence in the negative by
stating that it excludes 'stray remarks in the workplace,' 'statements by
nondecisionmakers,' and 'statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself.""' 0
Courts often found that unless a plaintiff could demonstrate that a
defendant "actually relied on racial stereotypes in making its decision,
[a] plaintiffs reference to derogatory comments or racial slurs...
[would be] insufficient to support a claim of discrimination under Title
VII.""' Even as these courts "recognize[d] that summary judgment is
often inappropriate in cases involving issues of discriminatory intent and
motive, which are often difficult to establish," they stressed that "a
plaintiff bringing a Title VII action bears the burden of persuasion at all
times" and that more than simply unfair treatment needs to be
established; all of the relevant dots need to be connected."12
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa that
to establish a jury question as to a section 703(m) mixed-motive
violation, "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice.""' 3  In holding that direct evidence was not
required for a plaintiff to bring a so-called mixed-motive claim, the Court
essentially did away with the distinction between circumstantial and
direct evidence in the context of determining the proper analytical
framework to apply.1 4 In the wake of this case, however, lower courts
109. Id.
110. EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989)); see also Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMoRY L.J.
1887, 1913 (2004) (noting that "lower courts could not begin to agree on what constituted 'direct'
evidence").
111. See Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 90 C 1823, 1994 WL 517244, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 20, 1994).
112. See id.
113. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
114. See id. at 98-99; see also Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving
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remained confused about what type and strength of evidence could
buttress a Title VII claim."'
By way of illustration, the Sixth Circuit panel in Lautermilch, the
case discussed earlier in which the terminated male teacher was called
"too macho," decided several months after Desert Palace, divided
bitterly over more than just the case's similarity or lack thereof to
Hopkins.'16  Whereas the majority employed the McDonnell Douglas
framework in its disposition of the plaintiff s claim, the dissent observed:
The majority appears to hold that the "too macho" comment by the
decision-maker at the termination hearing does not constitute direct
evidence, and even if it were direct evidence the majority concludes
that Lautermilch has failed to show pretext. The Supreme Court,
however, has made it abundantly clear that the McDonnell Douglas test
does not apply, where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.
The proper synthesis of McDonnell Douglas, Hopkins, and Desert
Palace has been hotly debated and is outside the scope of this Article,"'
but it should be noted that widespread confusion has persisted in the
courts.119  Most courts, however, agree that after Desert Palace, a
plaintiff trying to establish intentional discrimination may proceed
"either (1) directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or (2) indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 20 With
respect to the so-called direct method, the plaintiff "may present either
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, so long as it is
sufficient to satisfy his ultimate burden."1 21  That said, courts have
accused one another of confusing the direct and indirect methods of
proof with a distinction between direct and indirect or circumstantial
Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1243, 1252-53 (2008) (noting that "the Court set the stage for
the eventual destruction of the view that there are only two categories of individual disparate
treatment cases").
115. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) ("It is not
entirely clear exactly what this evidence must be, but nothing in Price Waterhouse suggests that a
certain type or quantity of evidence is required to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.").
116. Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 2003).
117. Id.at277.
118. For more discussion see Zimmer, supra note 114, at 1249-52.
119. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REv. 191, 210 n.81 (2009).
120. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
121. Id. (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
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evidence.12 2  Some courts persist in identifying evidence as direct or
indirect,12 3  allowing this identification to predicate an appropriate
analytical framework for adjudicating a summary judgment motion,
while others do not. 12 4  Some courts have recognized that to require a
smoking gun comment in order to sustain a discrimination case would
run counter to Desert Palace's proclamation that even in the context of a
mixed-motive case, circumstantial evidence is no less compelling than
so-called direct evidence.12 5
Still, with so much up in the air about how these cases should
proceed, what may be said about each analysis is that, essentially, each
court "need only inquire whether [the plaintiffl presents 'enough
evidence to permit a finding that there was differential treatment in an
employment action and that the adverse employment decision was
caused at least in part by a forbidden type of bias."'l 2 6 With this in mind,
122. See, e.g., Kogucki v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (N.D. Ill.
2010) ("The Seventh Circuit has said on more [th]an one occasion that its formulae for resolving
Title VII summary judgment motions is confusing. . . . Indeed, several of its own cases 'arguably
conflate the direct method with direct evidence.' And while circumstantial evidence is not direct,
the court has said it 'must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action."'
(quoting Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2008))); cf White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Since Desert Palace, the federal courts of
appeals have, without much, if any, consideration of the issue, developed widely differing
approaches to the question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII mixed-
motive cases.").
123. See, e.g., Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 2007)
("Desert Palace is entirely consistent with our precedent under which a plaintiff survives summary
judgment either by providing direct evidence of discrimination or by creating an inference of
discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas framework."); Debose v. Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families, No. 1:05-cv-001 67-MP-AK, 2008 WL 3926858, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2008) ("[The
plaintiff] may satisfy [her] burden in one of two ways. First, under the traditional framework, she
may proffer direct evidence of discrimination. .. . If direct evidence is unavailable, [she] may
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework of McDonnell Douglas." (internal
citation omitted)).
124. See, e.g., Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2005) ("This court,
however, following the Supreme Court's command in Desert Palace,... has rejected the
requirement that there be direct evidence in mixed-motive cases; any evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, may be amassed to show, by preponderance, discriminatory motive."); McGinest,
360 F.3d at 1122 (allowing a mixed-motive plaintiff to "proceed ... using the McDonnell Douglas
framework, or alternatively,... simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that
a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated" the employment decision); cf White, 533
F.3d at 398-99 (discussing the various ways in which federal courts have approached the summary
judgment analysis for mixed-motive Title VII cases since Desert Palace).
125. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2009) ("We reject the district
court's requirement that Miller's words explicitly indicate that Chadwick's sex was the basis for
Miller's assumption about Chadwick's inability to balance work and home. To require such an
explicit reference (presumably use of the phrase 'because you are a woman,' or something similar)
to survive summary judgment would undermine the concept of proof by circumstantial evidence, and
would make it exceedingly difficult to prove most sex discrimination cases today.").
126. Casella v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., No. 8-176-B-W, 2009 WL 1621411, at *22 (D. Me. June
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the question of evidence's sufficiency, and not its classification, will be
the focus of the rest of this Article.
Jurists' lack of consensus as to when the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to stereotyping cases and as to when a "stray remark"
should operate to preclude summary judgment highlights their
underlying lack of understanding of precisely why, when, and how
stereotypes are pernicious in the context of Title VII cases. While some
scholars are bothered by some courts' quick resort to dubbing a comment
"stray" in order to dispose of questions of intent to discriminate and thus
the entire case,12 7 other judges and scholars fear a scenario in which a
comment, from its context probative of nothing, serves to prop up and
sustain an otherwise meritless allegation of discrimination. But what
exactly is a stereotype-this word so frequently used by courts and
litigants with no further clarification? And when does the use of a
stereotype in the formulation of a comment or a standard by an
employer's agent evince the requisite intent to discriminate?
III. WHAT IS STEREOTYPING?
A. The Psychology of Stereotyping
Psychologist John Bargh says that "'stereotypes are categories that
have gone too far."'l 2 8  They are "schemas-preexisting theories and
,0129frameworks that help us understand our raw experiences. A
stereotype may also be conceptualized as "a cognitive structure that
contains sweeping concepts of the behaviors, traits and attitudes
associated with the members of a social category."130  Most people
intuitively recognize stereotypes, and most grasp the threat that
9, 2009); accord White, 533 F.3d at 402 ("The ultimate question for the court in making a summary
judgment determination in such a case is not whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence
to survive the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens, but rather whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's motivation for its adverse employment
decision, and, if none are present, whether the law-42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)-supports a judgment
in favor of the moving party on the basis of the undisputed facts.").
127. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying (Cases):
Gender Stereotypes and Sexual Harassment Since the Passage of Title VII, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 533, 539 (2005) ("Even though a complaint may include a statement clearly indicative of
gender bias, the court, by labeling the statement as a 'stray remark,' categorically excludes it from
evidence.").
128. Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
May-June 1998, at 53.
129. DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING 170 (2004).
130. Antony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 187 (2005).
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stereotyped beliefs-like "Latinos have bad tempers" or "Jewish people
are cheap"-pose to the goals of civil rights and antidiscrimination law.
Such stereotypes' geneses typically lie in invidious bias or ignorance and
have been perpetuated in both private life-such as in the home"' -and
public life-such as in the workplacel 32 -and by the media and other
outlets of cultural consciousness. 13 3  Individuals subscribe to
stereotypical beliefs on conscious and subconscious or unconscious
levels. 13 4
People tend to depend more on group-based impressions when
forming judgments or opinions than they do on individuating attributes,
leading them to socially categorize others as group members rather than
individuals and to take note of whether others are members of their own
groups or not.13 5  This resultant classification of others into so-called
ingroup and outgroup members leads people to form evaluative biases,
whereby they become inclined to regard members of their own groups
more positively than those who are not members of these groups.136 As a
result, attributes of outgroup members become magnified as stereotypes
take form because they furnish "stable explanations for the group's
behavior, which enhance feelings of predictability," but often engender
contempt.13 7  Thus, inasmuch as substantive stereotypes shape
evaluations of individual group members and contour societal standards
and models of behavior and appearance, stereotypes compel individual
and societal responses to and often avoidance of group members.138
It is the tendency of human beings to process and evaluate
individuals who belong to their same group more positively and in a
more trenchant manner and to accord ingroup members more trust.
Correspondingly, "[m]embers of other groups are viewed with suspicion
131. See Mary C. Gentile, How We Learn Who We Are, in GENDER NONCONFORMITY, RACE,
AND SEXUALITY: CHARTING THE CONNECTIONS 180, 181-83 (Toni Lester ed., 2002).
132. See JACQUELINE DELAAT, GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE: A CASE STUDY APPROACH 4-7
(1999).
133. See, e.g., LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE
11 (2006) ("Our individual biases dovetail with a set of social practices, patterns, and norms that
produce and reproduce unintentional discrimination and have become so familiar that they define
our sense of what is 'normal,' and, in turn, what is 'real' . . .. "); SCHNEIDER, supra note 129, at 351-
53.
134. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, in 7
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 55, 67-68 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994).
135. John F. Dovidio & Michelle R. Hebl, Discrimination at the Level of the Individual:
Cognitive and Affective Factors, in DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BASES 11, 14-15 (Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella eds., 2005).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id. at 16-17; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 129, at 226-27.
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and competitively." 39  So-called outgroup members are regarded with
enhanced suspicion, negativity, and animosity. 14 0  People tend to
accentuate intergroup differences and to minimize differences discernible
within a group.141 Therefore, scholars have posited that, with respect to
race in particular, "[i]n the United States, people automatically activate
mental representations of racial group memberships when they see a
person of another race. They become spontaneously aware of the
person's racial group membership, which makes them also think more
about their own group membership." 42
Stereotyping in the context of employment discrimination is a
category-based cognitive response to another person that attempts to
structure one's experience with that person.14 3  Social cognition
demonstrates that much of stereotyping occurs at the sub or unconscious
levels; repeated activation causes stereotypes to inhere in the minds and
processes of those who might not even believe that they subscribe to or
harbor stereotyped beliefs.'" Stereotypes function as "social schemas,"
139. John F. Dovidio, Racial Bias, Unspoken But Heard, 326 Sci. 1641, 1642 (2009); see also
Dovidio & Hebl, supra note 135, at 15 (finding that people retain more detailed and more positive
information about ingroup than outgroup members, reminding themselves why outgroup members
are dissimilar to the self).
140. Maria-Paoloa Paladino & Luigi Castelli, On the Immediate Consequences of Intergroup
Categorization: Activation of Approach and Avoidance Motor Behavior Toward Ingroup and
Outgroup Members, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 755, 755 (2008) (finding that
automatic attitudes and perceptions toward outgroup members tend to be more negative than toward
ingroup members).
141. See Dovidio, supra note 139, at 1642; Paladino & Castelli, supra note 140, at 755; Barbara
F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319, 321
(2000).
142. Dovidio, supra note 139, at 1642.
143. Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 621, 623 (1993); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:
A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161, 1188 (1995) ("[P]erhaps most significant for present purposes, [stereotypes] bias a
decisionmaker's judgment long before the 'moment of decision,' as a decisionmaker attends to
relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it from memory."); Elizabeth E. Theran,
"Free to Be Arbitrary and... Capricious": Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 117 (2001) ("Stereotyping
is generally understood as the cognitive component of these category-based reactions: the part
arising from and relating to the thought process, by which we process information and assign
meaning to experience.").
144. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
REv. 741, 745-49 (2005) (discussing how unconscious discrimination can lead to an employer's
decision); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 997, 1031 (2006)
("[A]ctors often do not realize that they have formed biased judgments of others."); see also Ramona
L. Paetzold, Using Law and Psychology to Inform Our Knowledge of Discrimination, in
DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASES, supra note 135, at
329, 336 (finding that studies suggest that discriminatory behavior may be automatic and a person
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or categorical structures that engender implicit theories that predictably
bias individuals' interpretation, encoding, retention, and memories when
it comes to others to whom they have been exposed. 14 5  Stereotyping
permits differentiation and organization of groups and group members
via cognitive shortcuts.14 6  It is distinct from prejudice, which goes to
one's affect, and from discrimination, which goes to one's behavior, in
that stereotyping underlies one's beliefs about another based upon the
other's group membership.14 7
To the extent that stereotypes and stereotypical images seep into
cultural consciousness, they have been particularly nefarious to members
of historically disadvantaged minority groups. For example, one-
dimensional, distorted, and offensive depictions of African American
women as, among other things, lazy, oversexualized, or overbearing have
become part of "America's cultural pattern" via their appearances in
American literature, film, and popular culture.148  These pernicious
portrayals became entrenched and have led to discriminatory and often
abhorrent societal and legal treatment of African American women.
"[A]s long as .. . these stereotypes remain unchallenged, even if ...
dismissed by most scholars, they hinder progress."l4 9
Two types of stereotypes have been recognized: descriptive
stereotypes, which purport to narrate the way in which group members
tend to behave or appear, and prescriptive stereotypes, which purport to
describe how group members ought to behave.150 Stereotypes thus create
expectations that serve as baseline starting points for the construction of
one's impression of a group member, while simultaneously constraining
perceptions of group members, operating as a form of social limitation or
control.' 5' The information that buttresses and reinforces stereotypes is
unconsciously absorbed, pursued, preferred, and remembered by people
more readily and more rapidly than other information, becoming quickly
may act absent awareness of the intention to engage in that behavior).
145. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1188.
146. See Reskin, supra note 141, at 321 ("These processes, sometimes characterized as cognitive
'shortcuts,' occur regardless of people's feelings toward other groups or their desires to protect or
improve their own status.").
147. See Dovidio & Hebl, supra note 135, at 13 (defining "prejudice" as an "unfair negative
attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a member of that group").
148. See Jacklyn Huey & Michael J. Lynch, The Image of Black Women in Criminology:
Historical Stereotypes as Theoretical Foundation, in JUSTICE WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 72, 78-88 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1996).
149. Id. at 86; see also Irene Browne & Ivy Kennelly, Stereotypes and Realities: Images ofBlack
Women in the Labor Market, in RACE, WORK, AND FAMILY IN THE LIVES OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
185, 185-88 (Marlese Durr & Shirley A. Hill eds., 2006).
150. Fiske, supra note 143, at 623-24.
15 1. See id.
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assimilated and integrated into individuals' world pictures. 15 2
Stereotypes are thus tenacious and infectious as they seep into and spread
across cultural consciousness.1 5 3
A stereotype, however, need not be negative, nor untrue; it must
merely create a nexus between a group of people and a characteristic.14
What stereotyping does is simplify and routinize one's experience of the
world, causing one to rely on the crudest, most "cartoonish" constructs of
others. 155
Stereotypes constructed by the preconceived or assumed traits,
predilections, or characteristics that one assigns to a group have long
been held up by those who study class-based discrimination as both
indicators and generators of discrimination.156 Indeed, "negative
stereotypes evolve from negative aspects of the inter-group relations
(inequality, competition, relative deprivation)" and may be "strongly
reinforced by the attribution of harmful goals to outgroups."',5 7 Negative
class-based stereotypes not only operate to cement and reinforce negative
and baseless images of class members in the eyes of outsiders,'58 but they
also operate to engender bad self images, and worse, bad self-fulfilling
prophecies for the group members who themselves are indoctrinated with
them.159
152. Reskin, supra note 141, at 322; see also Paetzold, supra note 144, at 335 (discussing how
stereotypes can be activated automatically by exposure to relevant features of a stereotyped
individual and how stereotypes can also be activated by constructs that are part of the stereotype);
Paladino & Castelli, supra note 140, at 755 ("Research has extensively studied the affective and
cognitive processes that are automatically triggered when individuals are faced with ingroup and
outgroup members. Spontaneous affective responses toward outgroup members tend to be more
negative in comparison to ingroup members and automatic stereotyping arises." (citation omitted)).
153. See Reskin, supra note 141, at 322 ("The cognitive processes involved in stereotyping make
stereotypes tenacious. People unconsciously pursue, prefer, and remember 'information' that
supports their stereotypes (including remembering events that did not occur), and ignore, discount,
and forget information that challenges them.").
154. Page, supra note 130, at 187-88.
155. See id at 188.
156. See Louk Hagendoom & Hub Linssen, Group Goal Attributions and Stereotypes in Five
Former Soviet States, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON RACISM 171, 172-73 (Jessika ter Wal &
Maykel Verkuyten eds., 2000).
157. Id. at 175.
158. See Charles Stangor & Mark Schaller, Stereotypes as Individual and Collective
Representations, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 3, 13 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996)
("Once group stereotypes exist in a culture, expected patterns of behavior for those group members
follow, and these expectations determine both responses to group members and the behavior of the
group members themselves.").
159. See Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotyping, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1052 (2004). The author cites several studies, one of which was conducted
by a team of social psychologists that documented a phenomenon they referred to as "stereotype
threat." Id. The related experiment demonstrated how members of stereotyped groups were less
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Thus, stereotypes in American law have assigned people a trait or
property on the basis that a group to which they might belong-gender,
race, religion-has a high statistical correlation with that attribute, even
where the correlation does not hold up on an individual basis.16 0 They
also serve to engender and perpetuate false beliefs about a group, cause
employment decision-makers to impose normative beliefs about what
attributes a member of a group should possess, and cause those decision-
makers to impose standards and requirements on individuals
accordingly. 16 1 For this reason, recent scholarship in this area has
observed that the very word stereotype, as it is used in antidiscrimination
law, "is being asked to do too much work," which generates needless
confusion. 162
B. Examples of Stereotyping in the Workplace
A recent article on the ABA Journal website demonstrated the use of
stereotypes in the employment context. It reported that three quarters of
female lawyers of color leave their respective law firms within five years
of starting due to the challenges they encounter in the workplace, like
"unwanted or unfair critical attention" and institutional discrimination. 63
Interestingly, this discrimination is typically expressed in the form of
gender and racial stereotypes present in the beliefs and attitudes of
decision-makers and other superiors at the firms.'6" According to the
study,
Women of color have a greater sense of "outsider status" than other
groups, according to the Sun-Times summary of the report. They
able (intellectually) to perform well on standardized tests after they would be reminded that they
were stereotyped against. Id. When the researchers did not invoke (remind) the stereotype against
the members of the group, they performed just as well as the nonminority white males. Id; see also
WANG, supra note 133, at 64-66; Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using
Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 409 (2003) ("People and jobs both are gendered, which gives
stereotypes a profound effect on everyday interactions in the workplace. In addition to shaping
expectations, stereotypes also can influence behavior, given that 'people tend to engage in behaviors
they believe are approved by significant others."').
160. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotype and the Shaping of Identity, in PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAw 55, 63 (Robert C. Post ed.,
2001).
161. See id. at 64-65.
162. Id. at 63.
163. Debra Cassens Weiss, Why More Than 75% of Minority Female Lawyers Leave Law Firms
Within 5 Years, A.B.A. J.-L. NEWS Now (July 22, 2009, 9:41 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/whymore than_75_of minorityfemalelawyersleavelaw_firms_within_5_years/.
164. Id
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reported more racial and gender stereotyping, and more feelings of
sexism than white women. They also said they missed out on high-
profile assignments and important client engagements, and had limited
growth opportunities.165
Moreover, these results resonated with a study done by the ABA's
Commission on Women in the Profession and reported in an August
2006 article.'6 6 The ABA study revealed that female lawyers of color
reported being addressed by the same name as other lawyers of the same
ethnicity, having it assumed that if they were Latinas, they would know
how to speak Spanish and enjoy spicy food, that if they were Asian-
American, they were subjected to stereotypes about their being
"subservient or willing to work nonstop," and that if they were African
American, they confronted "stereotypes about affirmative action or
having quick-to-flash personalities."
As upsetting as these reports and findings are, the true nature of the
problems confronted by these women in the workplace is seemingly
revealed in the anonymous comments posted on the ABA's website after
the article. Ranging from the wholly unsympathetic and detached-
"Why did they become lawyers if they just pick up and leave[?]"16 8-to
the skeptical-"In order to verify something as a 'stereotype' we're
going to need stats" 169-to the outright bitter and belligerent-"Dear
female minority lawyers: Start your own firms then! Frankly, female
minority lawyers have Biglaw employment opportunities that most law
grads can only dream of"l70 -the comments reveal a depth of
indifference, ignorance, and animus toward these women among at least
some of the online readers of the ABA Journal.
They reveal something more than that, though. They reveal a lack of
understanding about how and why stereotypes harbored and acted upon
in the workplace are so nefarious. One poster on the site asked, "what
percentage of Latina attorneys can, in fact, speak Spanish?," reasoning
that "[i]f the number is greater than 50%, people are not stereotyping-
they're basing their conclusions on statistics. Now if the percentage of
Latina attorneys who speak Spanish is less than 10%, then perhaps their
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Alexander, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009, 10:03 AM).
169. J.D., Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009, 10:18 AM).
170. ded@gmail.com, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009, 10:19 AM).
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coworkers are not basing their assumptions on reality.""'7  This raises
more than one interesting point.
C. Is Stereotyping "Bad"?
In the first place, not all stereotyping is "bad." 72 Indeed, many of
the stereotypes reported by the ABA study participants-such as
speaking Spanish, liking spicy foods, or being willing to work
nonstop3 -are either innocuous or positive characterizations in the
abstract. But this is the key. The characterizations are neutral or
positive in the abstract-when they are divorced from a forced
presumption that stems directly from the individual's protected class
status, potentially obscuring other attributes and an objective, integrated
view of the individual. They are innocuous or positive when they are
actually true or at least truly discernible when the individual is not
viewed through the lens of her protected class status.
In the second place, where statistics tend to bear out a fact, the law
and rational human beings indeed often permit inferences of an
underlying truth in conformity with those statistics. However, in the
employment arena, one's tendency to regard someone through the lens of
their protected class status and not as an individual for whom individual
facts and attributes can be discerned based upon experience often belies
one's vulnerability to prejudicial thinking. Unlike in the law of
evidence, where the goal is to ascertain the truth with few means and
sometimes little information at one's disposal, the law of employment
discrimination is crafted to compel the evaluation and treatment of
employees in the workplace in a manner that is individualized and free of
animus, prejudgment, or bias.
In the third place, while taking issue with the notion that, for
example, Latinas are often presumed to know Spanish, may be to some,
171. J.D., Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009, 10:18 AM).
172. See Craig McGarty et al., Social, Cultural and Cognitive Factors in Stereotype Formation,
in STEREOTYPES AS EXPLANATIONS: THE FORMATION OF MEANINGFUL BELIEFS ABOUT SOCIAL
GROUPS 1, 2 (Craig McGarty et al. eds., 2002) (explaining that stereotypes assist in making sense of
one's environment through the following: "(a) stereotypes are aids to explanation, (b) stereotypes are
energy-saving devices, and (c) stereotypes are shared group beliefs. The first of these implies that
stereotypes should form so as to help the perceiver make sense of a situation, the second implies that
stereotypes should form to reduce effort on the part of the perceiver, and the third implies that
stereotypes should be formed in line with the accepted views or norms of social groups that the
perceiver belongs to").
173. See Weiss, supra note 163.
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as another poster put it, "anecdotal and non-serious,"1 74 it is important to
recognize that subconscious and even unconscious discriminatory beliefs
operate to render stereotypes much more nefarious when fully unpacked.
So, for example, is there anything per se illegal about the fact that an
employer views a Latina employee as likely able to speak Spanish? The
answer to this is clearly no. However, what if she cannot speak Spanish
and the employer is subsequently disappointed in a way in which he
would not be if she were another ethnicity? What if, either on a
conscious or subconscious level, he believes further that non-native
English speakers, or even that those who are fluent in a language other
than English, speak English that is in some way compromised? While
clearly government cannot outlaw stereotypical beliefs, cognizance of
those beliefs and recognizing how deep-rooted or far-reaching they may
be is the only way in which to accurately ferret out certain instances of
disparate treatment on the basis of protected class status. And that is the
end game in employment discrimination jurisprudence.
Hopkins recognized the unique role of stereotyping in class-based
discrimination but failed to define the contours of when and how its rule
should apply to subsequent cases that allege stereotyped comments as
evidence of or a basis for a valid Title VII claim. There are many
problems with courts' ubiquitous resort to Hopkins and the wildly
disparate results they reach without amply fleshing out the precise
queries that they undertake.
D. Classes ofStereotyping
Although the case law invoking Hopkins does not distinguish among
the various kinds of stereotypes used by decision-makers in the
employment context, it may be observed that there are, essentially, two
major classes of stereotypes. The first kind of stereotype, "intergroup
bias," castigates the entire protected class, prejudging a member on the
basis of her membership. With intergroup bias, the discriminator harbors
a wholesale bias toward one or more entire protected classes. So the
stereotype "all women tend to be hysterical; you are a woman, and
therefore, I believe that you're probably hysterical, and I am more
inclined to see you as hysterical" would fall within this category.
The second kind of stereotype evinces what may be called an
"intraclass preference." With the evolution of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence has come an awareness on the part of those who harbor
174. Monkey C, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009, 10:56 AM).
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class-based animus on any level that explicit discriminatory statements
and practices-like categorically refusing to hire African Americans or
even making statements that fit into the first stereotype category
described above-will quickly cause them to run afoul of the law and be
susceptible to public scrutiny. The manifestations of prejudice, then,
have evolved, whereas the core prejudices harbored may not have. Thus,
intraclass preferences may inhere, whereby a decision-maker may realize
on some level that he needs to hire members of a protected class but
nonetheless engages in discrimination within the class, preferring those
who do not conform to the stereotype of the class to which he adheres.
So, for example, a bigoted decision-maker may hire an African American
whom he does not consider to be "too African American," or he may
promote a woman who he thinks possesses more masculine qualities. He
may engage in an evaluation of candidates that searches for one who is
considered "exceptional" for transcending the expected limitations of his
class or embodying unusual traits and assets considering her class.
In this category of stereotyping, then, unlike the former, there is
likely to be less accompanying evidence of class-based animus or
attitudes of any sort. Where an employer subscribes to garden variety
intergroup bias and makes stereotyped comments indicative of such a
bias, his employment records and statistics should bear out this bias if he
acts upon it. Even without the stereotyped comment, a statistically based
case of the systemic disparate treatment of the group will likely emerge.
To the extent that this does not happen, it is likely that where a decision-
maker acts upon his bias with respect to even one employee or one open
position, that employee likely will be able to make out a prima facie case
of employment discrimination because the employer will typically
replace the employee with someone outside her protected class. 175
This is not the case with intraclass preferences evinced by
stereotyping. First, because the discrimination and the preferences exist
within a protected class, the plaintiff, absent ample additional evidence,
will not even make out a prima facie case of discrimination. 17 6 Second,
the evidence that stereotyping even occurred will likely be scant, if it
exists at all, because employers are less likely to voice intragroup
175. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) ("To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a
significantly discriminatory impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate
that 'any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question,' in order to
avoid a finding of discrimination.").
176. But see Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 824 F. Supp. 842, 846 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (finding
that a plaintiff was not barred from establishing a prima facie racial discrimination case simply
because he was replaced by a person of his race).
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preferences aloud than interclass bias, and the employer is more likely to
code the preference-"Candidate A is more professional than Candidate
B" instead of "Candidate A acts less female, Asian, or so forth, than
Candidate B." The reason for this is obvious: decisions manifesting
intragroup preferences are less likely to come under scrutiny and require
an explanation or justification because the employer's statistics regarding
the protected class do not skew. Additionally, if the fired, demoted, or
non-selected employee's replacement is a member of the same class, the
employee is much less likely to make out so much as a prima facie case
of discrimination. Thus, an explanation or comment, even a coded one,
for a decision motivated by an intraclass preference is less likely to be
forthcoming. To the extent that a plaintiff in an intraclass preference
scenario somehow captures a stereotyped comment or attitude, it is truly
fortuitous and somewhat of a rare smoking gun not often attainable.
Courts are often too quick to dismiss stereotyped comments of all
varieties as "stray"-an overly generic term insufficiently connected to
the employment decision at issue. The fact that these comments are so
hard to come by, however, indicates that where they are articulated, they
likely do bear upon and reflect a mindset of discrimination or at least a
mindset of "disparate perception."
So where does this leave us? Can it ever be the case that an Asian
American is perceived as hardworking because she actually is? Or can it
be that a female employee is deemed too "girlish" because her maturity
and poise are not adequately developed or honed such that a male
associate with her demeanor would also be criticized or counseled? Title
VII was not designed to be a civility code; 77 Congress certainly did not
design it to prevent employers from levying certain legitimate criticisms
at certain individuals. But when a word that overtly references protected
class status, like "girlish," or when a tautology, like "you're a man; you
probably did it anyway," is used, need it necessarily come under such
scrutiny that it creates a material issue of fact as to bias as a matter of
law, so as to stave off a grant of summary judgment? This issue is
complicated, but it becomes less so when the issue of stereotyping is
broken down and the precise reasons why and when stereotyping in the
workplace evinces illegal discrimination are explained.
177. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998).
2011]) 623
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
E. Why Are Stereotypes Suspect?
As stated, not all stereotypes are pernicious, nor are they all
harbingers of discriminatory beliefs. Moreover, even stereotypes of
people are not always per se wrong in an employment context. For
example, upon hearing that someone went to a certain excellent law
school and served as a local bar association president, a prospective
employer might conjure up a stereotype of how intelligent or
professional the person is before meeting him or her.
When and why, then, should people and the law be wary of
stereotypes? There are two important reasons that stereotypes should be
viewed as suspect in employment discrimination law. In the first place,
they operate to impose different, often higher standards or expectations
on members of a protected class. So, for example, when Ann Hopkins's
evaluators found her to be the "wrong type of woman," or, in essence,
too manly of a woman to comport with their expectations of what a "lady
partner" should be like, they were imposing a standard upon her that
would not have been imposed had she been a man.
In a different but equally important vein, however, stereotypes are
typically substantively insidious, conjuring up monolithic, often
cartoonishly simplistic or offensive images of people based on their
protected class status. 17 8 If a decision-maker operates with a predefined
spectrum in his head as to how he expects an African American person,
for example, to speak, perform, or act, he evinces a mindset that shows
his predisposition to view African Americans through the filter of a lens
of negativity and limitation. He demonstrates that he encounters
members of a group with certain preconceived notions of how they will
likely act or appear and that he, himself, is likely predisposed to project
qualities or weaknesses onto group members or to shape his conception
or expectations of them in a disparate manner from that with which he
approaches nonclass members. From a dignitarian perspective, thinking
that incorporates stereotypes into the assimilation of one's world picture
is insidious because it erodes the integrity of how people are perceived
and often treated before they are even encountered. This erosion of the
integrity of the individual's image and perception contributes to
discrimination in the workplace by fueling prejudices and predispositions
178. See Charles Stangor, The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Within
Social Psychology: A Quick History of Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE,
STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (Todd Nelson ed., 2009).
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to create different expectations for some because of their protected class
status.
IV. WHY STEREOTYPING CAN PROVE DISCRIMINATION
Under section 703 of Title VII, an employer is prohibited from
failing or refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating
against any individual because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.'79  It is thus the case that, in the words of Professor Ann
McGinley, "[i]ntent lies at the heart of employment discrimination law.
For the vast -majority of cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1991, intent alone determines whether a violation has
occurred."180 Indeed, a disparate treatment cause of action will turn upon
the plaintiffs ability to demonstrate that she was treated differently with
respect to the terms and conditions of her employment "because of...
sex."181 What, exactly, this means, however, is less than clear.182
The problem is that as the law has rendered overt and explicit bias
taboo and socially unacceptable,183 invidious discrimination has had two
things happen to it. First, it has become expressed in increasingly subtle,
nuanced ways, with those harboring bigoted attitudes deploying coded
speech, tacit understandings, and unspoken, but acted-on preferences.184
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
180. Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucidn!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 416 (2000).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
182. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L.
REV. 83, 87 (2008) ("This language does not clearly require proof of purposeful or intentional
discrimination."); Hart, supra note 144, at 753 (discussing how the plaintiff has to show that the
decision was made "because of' his or her protected class); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of
Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintifs to
Prove that the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333,
338-41 (1999) (showing the various interpretations that courts have made in regard to the statutory
language); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 503 (2001)
("Discrimination is 'because of race, sex, age, etc. when the protected characteristic caused, in
whole or in part, the decision to occur.").
183. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment
Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 637 (2000) (stating that expressing certain racist or sexist views
is now considered unacceptable, and, as a result, it is unlikely that an employer will make a blatant
comment regarding race or sex).
184. Id. at 605-06 (examining studies and showing that discrimination is often subtle and
difficult to identify); see also Krieger, supra note 143, at 1244 (arguing that ingroup preferences are
often acted upon by employers); McGinley, supra note 180, at 445 ("Thus, to the degree that
intentionality must be demonstrated to prove discrimination legally, subtle and unintentional forms
of contemporary bias, such as aversive racism, may continue to exist and persist in disadvantaging
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Second, bias has become so deeply entrenched and repressed in some
who know that it is unacceptable, but nonetheless harbor, it that it has
morphed into subconscious, or even unconscious, bias in some
individuals.'85  This subconscious or unconscious bias, however, while
not in the forefront of one's consciousness, may prove to be more
invidious and pernicious than conscious or expressed bias because of its
ability to elude detection, bypass scrutiny, and defy proof.186 As recently
as 2009, the Supreme Court appeared to take judicial notice of this,
observing that "[e]mployers responded to [Title VII in the wake of its
enactment] by eliminating rules and practices that explicitly barred racial
minorities from 'white jobs.' But removing overtly race-based job
classifications did not usher in genuinely equal opportunity. More
subtle-and sometimes unconscious-forms of discrimination replaced
once undisguised restrictions. ,
Courts have attempted to grapple with the notion that bias may be
less than conscious,' 88  and the law has evolved somewhat. This
evolution, however, has been punctuated by inconsistency, inadequately
justified and elucidated, and stymied by courts' inability to agree upon or
to articulate precisely what they are trying to do. Thus, scholars have
criticized the disparate treatment cause of action's intent requirement as
actually subverting the goals of Title VII, rather than comporting with
them, when more complex forms of discrimination, like stereotyping, are
present. 189 Professor Ruth Okediji, for example, stated:
Blacks relative to Whites in significant ways."); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform
Structure ofDisparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 619 (1996).
185. See McGinley, supra note 180, at 425 ("The truth of the matter is that events and operations
that completely evade conscious apprehension frequently trigger our evaluations, impressions and
behavioral responses.").
186. See Hart, supra note 144, at 744 ("[P]roblems of proof will always present barriers to the
ability of some individual plaintiffs to successfully demonstrate discriminatory motivation, whether
conscious or unconscious."); see also White & Krieger, supra note 182, at 506-11.
187. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696 (2009).
188. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that
discrimination can occur "regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the
evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias"); EEOC v. Inland
Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that disparate-treatment discrimination
occurs where a decision-maker applies subjective employment criteria, even without a conscious
intent to discriminate); Sweeny v. Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll., 604 F.2d 106, 113 n. 12 (1st Cir.
1979) (affirming judgment for plaintiff because the district court could have found the decision not
to promote plaintiff was based on "a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against women"); Thomas v. Troy
City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004) ("Such subjective decision-making
processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not by overt bigotry and hatred, but rather
by unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of-hence
the difficulty of ferreting out discrimination as a motivating factor.").
189. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747, 752 (2001); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII
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A stereotype serves as a proxy for truth and reduces the cost of
information gathering. When an employer makes a decision based
upon a stereotype, this decision, while clearly discriminatory, is not
necessarily the product of a conscious awareness or desire for a
particular outcome. Instead, a stereotype may be an honest conviction
about a characterization. Stereotyping is one obvious example of a
state of mind that may not satisfy the intent test required but,
nonetheless, has been held to constitute a violation of Title VII.
Unintended discrimination can be the product of stereotyping. If an
individual employer chooses not to expend the resources and efforts to
gather information about an employee but, instead, relies on a
stereotype, a plaintiff should be able to prevail in a Title VII action
without having to prove that the defendant had the intent or conscious
purpose to discriminate. 190
The D.C. Circuit in Hopkins noted that Title VII is "remedial rather
than punitive in nature" and "designed to remove 'artificial, arbitrary and
unnecessary barriers to employment"' that work to effectuate protected-
class-based discrimination. 191 Thus, it reasoned, "discriminatory motive
in disparate treatment cases does not function as a 'state of mind'
element, but as a method of ensuring that only those arbitrary or artificial
employment barriers . .. related to [protected class status] are
eliminated."' 92 Thus, according to the court, the fact that Ann Hopkins
may have fallen prey to unwitting or subconscious bias would not
preclude a finding of discriminatory motive.
The Supreme Court in Hopkins, as discussed, set forth what
Professor McGinley has referred to as the "stereotyping doctrine," which
envisions "overt stereotyping by a decisionmaker as virtually the
equivalent of direct evidence of discrimination."' 93 It has been the case,
then, Professor McGinley has argued, that Hopkins "unwittingly expands
the definition of intent to include the use of unconsciously or consciously
held stereotypes to make employment decisions."' 94  The decision-
makers there were held to have rejected Hopkins's candidacy because of
her sex, even though some may not have even been aware that her failure
Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2014-15 (1995);
Hart, supra note 144, at 743; Krieger, supra note 143, 1227-41 (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence
is unable to address the unconscious bias that the law should address).
190. Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment,
26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 49, 80-81 (1998).
191. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (internal quotations omitted)), rev'd on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
192. Id at 469.
193. McGinley, supra note 180, at 472.
194. Id. at 475.
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to conform to their expectations actually stemmed from their own
preconceived notions about what kind of woman a female partner should
be.'95  Title VII's intent requirement, then, should be met by showing
that a bias, whether or not conscious, effectively operated to somehow
impel the adverse decision at issue. 96
A few courts have found that Title VII's "ultimate question is
whether the employee has been treated disparately 'because of race"' and
that "[t]his is so regardless of whether the employer consciously intended
to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking
stereotypes or bias."l 9 7  However, even the First Circuit opinion from
which this assertion comes conceded that "[t]he language in certain other
First Circuit cases might suggest that an express and conscious employer
intent to discriminate is critical to . . . the McDonnell Douglas ...
inquiry," despite the fact that the Supreme Court "has not reconsidered
Price Waterhouse's conclusion that the phrase 'because of ... is not
limited to expressly conscious intent."' 98 Moreover, to the extent that a
few courts have been explicit about using Title VII to guard against the
dangers of subconscious or unconscious discrimination, this has
traditionally been done largely within the confines of discussing the
dangers of employers using interviews or other "subjective" gauges to
ascertain merit.199 Finally, even those few courts that have recognized
195. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) ("Certainly a plausible-and, one
might say, inevitable-conclusion to draw from this set of circumstances is that the Policy Board in
making its decision did in fact take into account all of the partners' comments, including the
comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women's proper deportment.").
196. See McGinley, supra note 180, at 475; see also Hart, supra note 144, at 746 (recognizing
that "[b]y focusing the legal inquiry on the employer's intent at the moment an employment decision
is made," the courts have not recognized the idea that the bias may be unconscious); Krieger, supra
note 143, at 1242-43 (criticizing various courts' interpretations of Title VII as requiring proof of
conscious intent to discriminate); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 144, at 1034 ("A decision maker can
act because of or on the basis of a target person's race, sex, or other group status, while subjectively
believing that he or she is acting on the basis of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."); cf
Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REv. 913, 926 (1999) (asserting
that Title VII omits any recognition of unconscious bias and requires "proof of conscious,
discriminatory intent"). But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1134
(1999) (arguing that employers should not be held liable for unconscious biases).
197. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1999).
198. Id. at 58 n.13, 60 n.14.
199. See, e.g., Woods v. Boeing Co., 355 F. App'x 206, 210 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[The] use of
subjective criteria, while not alone sufficient to show discrimination, is evidence that a jury may use
to find pretext."); Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Where
termination decisions rely on subjective evaluations, careful analysis of possible impermissible
motivations is warranted .... ); Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.
2002) ("Courts view with skepticism subjective evaluation methods such as the one here."); Bergene
v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001)
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subconscious or unconscious discrimination as pernicious have
nonetheless typically gone on to foreclose a plaintiffs case, holding that
evidence of such discrimination was irrelevant or insufficient, even
where the plaintiff could point to, for example, race-based comments.20 0
The fact of the matter is, however, that even post-Hopkins, many
courts have continued to insist that plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases
"prove not only that [they were] treated differently, but that such
treatment was caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination. 2 0 1 In
1994, then-Third Circuit Judge Samuel Alito questioned the viability of a
disparate treatment plaintiffs proffer of evidence of unconscious
discrimination and referred to such a theory of a Title VII case as
"unconventional."2 02 Moreover, courts have found explicitly that
("Against the background of the other evidence of pretext, the subjective nature of these criteria
provides further circumstantial evidence that SRP denied Bergene the promotion as a form of
retaliation, rather than because of DeGraff's superior qualifications."); Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Because of the availability of seemingly neutral rationales
under which an employer can hide its discriminatory intent ... there is reason to be concerned about
the possibility that an employer could manipulate its decisions to purge employees it wanted to
eliminate."); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998) ("It is true that an
employer's use of subjective criteria may leave it more vulnerable to a finding of discrimination,
when a plaintiff can point to some objective evidence indicating that the subjective evaluation is a
mask for discrimination."); McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment and finding that "the extremely subjective nature of the
employer's stated promotion criteria" was central to the analysis); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d
793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[S]ubjective evaluations 'are more susceptible of abuse and more likely to
mask pretext."' (quoting Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1989))); Waltman v.
Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 482 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he criteria IPCO used to make promotion
decisions was highly subjective, which, as this court has held in previous cases, makes it easier to
discriminate.").
200. See, e.g., Douglas v. J.C. Penney Co., 474 F.3d 10, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2007); EEOC v. Francis
W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Ultimately, the EEOC must show that Parker's
rationale is pretextual and that the salary system is predicated on some stereotype, conscious or
unconscious. Otherwise, summary judgment in favor of Parker is proper."); see also White &
Krieger, supra note 182, at 507 ("Indeed, there exist surprisingly few published Title VII disparate
treatment decisions in which, after acknowledging the existence of unconscious bias, a court has
ruled in favor of the plaintiff or reversed a trial court ruling for the defendant on that basis.").
201. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1168; see also, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1312-
13 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that to prevail, the plaintiff had to prove termination of employment
was the result of intentional discrimination based on a plaintiffs national origin); Warren v.
Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 752-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding discriminatory intent means
actual motive and cannot be presumed based upon a factual showing of less than actual motive);
Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1432 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Disparate treatment analysis
is concerned with intentional discrimination, not subconscious attitudes."); White & Krieger, supra
note 182, at 502 ("For intentional discrimination to exist, the employer must act because of the
protected characteristic, not in spite of it."); Zimmer, supra note 110, at 1896 (stating that the
plaintiff has the ultimate burden of showing "that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination").
202. Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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discrimination in other contexts, such as in jury selection, must be shown
to have been conscious and "purposeful."203
Why then, post-Hopkins, does confusion as to intentional
discrimination persist? One scholar has noted that while Ann Hopkins
was clearly the victim of stereotyping that evinced discrimination, the
Supreme Court chose instead to "focus[] on the employer's conscious
state of mind-intent rather than motive."204 If intent and motive are
viewed, respectively, as this scholar defined them, as "the state of mind
with which the act is done or omitted" and that which "prompts a person
to act or fail to act, which could include stereotypes," then their
inadvertent conflation or confusion could certainly be seen as
undercutting Hopkins's most basic premise: when beliefs that lie beneath
one's consciousness impel an adverse action, that action may still have
been taken because of protected-class status.205
There is widespread agreement among scholars that despite the
persistence of this trend, this construction no longer keeps pace with the
current form or status of discrimination in the workplace because the
mechanics and manifestations of discrimination have evolved since the
passage of Title VII.2 0 6 The paradigm of discrimination contoured and
prohibited by Title VII is simply not seen by those who study the
realities of discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere as ample to
engage with the increasingly nuanced and repressed, albeit present
discrimination that manifests itself in contemporary society. 2 07
As Professor Charles Lawrence has observed:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this
shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and
beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this
cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the
same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize
203. United States v. Roebke, 333 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003).
204. Pollard, supra note 196, at 931 n.94.
205. Id; see also Okediji, supra note 190, at 80-81; Zimmer, supra note 184, at 618-20.
206. McGinley, supra note 180, at 416; Krieger, supra note 143, at 1211.
207. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1211 ("The assumptions underlying Title VII's disparate
treatment theory have been so substantially undermined by social cognition theory that they can no
longer be considered valid."); White & Krieger, supra note 182, at 524 (discussing the faulty
assumptions made by Title VII jurisprudence with regard to "independent investigations" made by
higher-level supervisors); cf Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 95-99 (2003)
(arguing that what has been learned from cognitive social psychology should be applied to disparate-
impact theory and employment discrimination litigation).
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the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.
In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation. 208
Scholars have long lamented a fracture between the theory upon
which antidiscrimination jurisprudence is predicated and the realities of
the harm that the jurisprudence exists to police. 20 9  Professor Linda
Krieger, for example, has argued that the premises upon which Title VII
and its prevailing jurisprudence are modeled are outdated.210 She has
argued that "the assumptions undergirding disparate treatment theory
generally reflect the thinking about intergroup bias and human inference
accepted into the 1970s, these assumptions have been so undermined,
both empirically and theoretically, that they can no longer be considered
valid." 2 1 1 Instead, Professor Krieger and others have urged that many of
the alleged discriminatory adverse actions being litigated under Title VII
traditionally conceived of as stemming from discriminatory intent are
actually impelled by "a variety of categorization-related judgment errors
characterizing normal human cognitive functioning."2 12 Such scholars
have advocated a variety of approaches for capturing and regulating the
actual bias that engenders the harm that Title VII aims to eradicate.213
During the first half of the twentieth century, the predominant view
on bias and prejudice as understood by social psychologists was that it
was the product of a mode of thinking that deviated from "normal" or
acceptable thinking and functioning.214 Thus, the notion of bias harbored
by one less than fully cognizant of it was anathema to popular
understanding of what occurred when one experienced prejudice. Thus,
208. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
209. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 189, at 752-53; Flagg, supra note 189, at 2014-15; Hart,
supra note 144, at 743; Krieger, supra note 143, at 1164; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 901 (1993).
210. See generally Krieger, supra note 143 (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence is insufficient to
address subtle or unconscious forms of bias).
211. Id. at 1165.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1166 (calling for "the nondiscrimination principle, currently interpreted as a
proscriptive duty 'not to discriminate,"' to "evolve to encompass a prescriptive duty of care to
identify and control for category-based judgment errors and other forms of cognitive bias in
intergroup settings").
214. See McGinley, supra note 180, at 418 n.9 (noting that "pathological personality structures"
were thought to cause prejudice); see also Hart, supra note 144, at 745 ("For the first half of the
twentieth century, psychologists and social theorists viewed prejudice primarily as a
psychopathology, 'a dangerous aberration from normal thinking."').
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lawmakers enacting legislation to arrest the effects of such attitudes and
the judges seeking to interpret bias were predisposed to conceive of and
engage with bias only in this rather one-dimensional form.
The application of the more modem social cognition theory and the
social sciences' endeavor to map the anatomy and genesis of prejudice,
bias, and the act of "stereotyping" to law has been laudably executed in
the scholarship of many, including Professor Krieger. The work of
social psychologists like Henri Tajfel, A.L. Wilkes, W.E. Vinacke, and
Donald Campbell has brought to light the principle that "cognitive
structures and processes involved in categorization and information
processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other
forms of biased intergroup judgment." 215 Thus, social cognition theory
should inform the law's understanding of stereotypes, reinforcing the
notions that (1) all people engage in stereotyping "to simplify the task of
perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in
memory"; (2) "once in place, stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and
decisionmaking"; and (3) "[s]tereotypes, when they function as implicit
prototypes or schemas, operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-
awareness." 216  Seen through this lens, the law must grapple with
stereotypes just as they are often formed, in a dispassionate, but
routinized manner, so as to combat the harms that they might confer and
to ensure that the broad remedial goals of Title VII are being met.2 17
According to social cognition theory, stereotypes foment
discrimination by shading or tainting the ways in which individuals
process information about and perceptions of others.2 18  The various
social schemas constructed and amassed by people as they extract and
process information from the world around them, including information
about others, mediate, structure, and order their subsequent encounters.219
215. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1187. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the history of
the study and understanding of bias and prejudice, which were initially conceived of as engendered
by prejudice and other "motivational processes" inconsistent with "normal cognitive processes," see
generally id.
216. Idat 1188.
217. This Article is only meant to give an overview of the research on subconscious and
unconscious bias. For more extensive research, see, for example, Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the
Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241 (2002);
Bodensteiner, supra note 182, at 99-107; Hart, supra note 144, at 745-49; Krieger, supra note 143,
at 1186-1211; McGinley, supra note 180, at 416.
218. See Krieger, supra note 143, at 1199; see also Reskin, supra note 141, at 320 ("In brief,
social cognition theory holds that people automatically categorize others into ingroups and
outgroups. The visibility and cultural importance of sex and race and their role as core bases of
stratification make them almost automatic bases of categorization.... Importantly, categorization is
accompanied by stereotyping, attribution bias, and evaluation bias.").
219. Krieger, supra note 143, at I199-1200.
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Thus, "[a]s a theoretical matter, the notion that racial, ethnic, or gender
distinctions could be ignored in the priming of schematic expectancies is,
at best, implausible. As an empirical matter, it is simply
insupportable." 2 20  Based upon the work of Fritz Heider, Galen
Bodenhausen, and Robert Wyer, and their contributions to attribution
theory,22 1 Professor Krieger urges that the law ought to recognize the
basic precept that "stereotypes operate as judgment heuristics in causal
attribution," and that "[o]nce a stereotype is activated, . . . [it] operates as
a kind of cognitive shortcut, bringing the search for additional causal
antecedents to a screeching halt."222
Still other scholars, said to be "behavioral realists," have buttressed
their claims about subconscious or unconscious bias with evidence
gleaned from the administration of Implicit Association Tests (IATs),
which test subjects' instinctive associations of various attributes with
members of different races.223 The results point strongly toward biases
that are innate, pronounced, and less than consciously harbored.224
Thus, courts should view evidence of stereotyping and any
stereotyped comments as probative, at least to some extent, of the
speaker's worldview and biases. Indeed, Professor Michael Zimmer has
argued that stereotyped comments are actually powerful evidence that
An incoming bit of information that "fits" an existing schema is said to "instantiate" that
particular schema. When this instantiation process activates a schema, other elements of
the schema are then imposed on the incoming experience. In other words, once a
particular schema is activated, incoming information tends to be ordered in a manner that
reflects the structure of the schema. In this way, a schema acts as an implicit expectancy:
We implicitly expect incoming information instantiating a particular schema to be
consistent with elements of that schema already present in its cognitive representation.
Id.; see also Susan T. Fiske, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 44 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 155,
168-69 (1993) (stating that categorization allows people to differentiate each other by group, allows
the outgroup homogeneity effect, whereby outgroups are seen as less variable than the ingroup,
allows greater familiarity with the ingroup and perception of greater variability across group
members, and allows people to make inferences based on the categorization); Reskin, supra note
141, at 320 (finding that once a person has categorized others into groups, the person often tends
automatically to feel toward particular members of the category in the same way in which he or she
feels toward the social category in general).
220. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1201-02; accord Dovidio & Hebl, supra note 135, at 12-13
(discussing how the cognitive component of individuals' attitudes involves specific thoughts or
beliefs about the attitude object and often involves automatic categorization); Dovidio, supra note
139, at 1642 (finding that people automatically group people according to their race).
221. Krieger, supra note 143, at 1204-05 (citing FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of
Stereotypes on Decision Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 267, 268, 279 (1985)).
222. Id. at 1206.
223. See Bodensteiner, supra note 182, at 102-03.
224. Id.
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ought to be seen as something akin to a statement against interest, rather
than as something too severable from the context of a given adverse
action to be relevant to a trier's considerations. 2 2 5 To the extent that
social mores dictate restraint when it comes to the utterance of such
comments, the fact of their vocalization ought to strengthen the
presumption of their truthfully representing the beliefs of the speaker.226
V. WHEN SHOULD COURTS APPLY HOPKINS?
As stated, courts habitually resort to Hopkins when adjudicating
claims alleging the illicit use of stereotypes in the workplace. However,
the law has not yet carefully broken down precisely when and why
stereotypes in the workplace are suspect or their exact role in how and
when a plaintiffs Title VII claim survives summary judgment. Hopkins
has been overcited, and it has come to be a one-size-fits-all solution to
allegations of stereotyping. It, however, furnishes no specific guidance
as to how to evaluate various stereotyping claims that arise in various
contexts. In reality, there are two major questions-and multiple issues
bound up within each question-that need to be addressed when a court
decides whether Hopkins applies to a stereotyping claim so as to permit
the claim to survive summary judgment. By examining cases in which
discrimination "because of' protected class status was alleged using
stereotyped comments or beliefs, the array of unarticulated queries and
approaches undertaken by courts may be demonstrated.
Although the courts have been less than explicit about this fact, a
court confronted with an allegation that a stereotyped comment or belief
evinces discrimination "because of' sex must address two primary
questions. The ultimate question, of course, is whether Hopkins applies
to the case so as to compel the court to view the comment or belief as
existing and serving as evidence of discrimination sufficient to at least
create a triable issue of fact. The first question-a focus of this Article-
is whether a stereotype is even in play. In other words, is there a
stereotyped belief, voiced or somehow acted upon, that could serve as
viable evidence of discrimination? The second question is when a
sufficient nexus may be said to exist between the stereotype and the
adverse action at issue.
225. Zimmer, supra note 184, at 619-21; see also Bodensteiner, supra note 182, at 114-20
(discussing the importance of stereotyped comments and the weight that should be given to them).
226. See Lawrence, supra note 208, at 340 ("[An] inadvertent slip of the tongue [is] not
random.").
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A. Is a Stereotype in Play?
Crucial to the analysis of discrimination alleged to be evinced or
motivated by a stereotyped belief is the threshold question of whether a
discernable stereotype is even in play. In cases in which a stereotyped
remark's evidentiary sufficiency is at issue, courts are asked to determine
whether the remark reflected a mindset, motive, or intention or whether it
was merely collateral and offhand. The issue of whether an invidious
stereotype is even in play, however, is a threshold issue.
The issue of whether stereotyping even occurred surfaced in
Weinstock v. Columbia University.227 In that case, the plaintiff alleged
stereotyping in conjunction with her denial of tenure at a university.2 28
Members of the plaintiffs evaluating committee referred to her as
"gentle and caring, 'nice,' a 'pushover,' and nurturing." 229 The plaintiff
proffered these comments in order to rebut the defendant's proffered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of tenure and to
establish pretext. The majority, however, held that the use of those
words failed to evince discrimination or pretext on the part of the
defendant. 2 30  The majority specifically distinguished the case from
Hopkins.23 1 It reasoned that Ann Hopkins had been spoken of
pejoratively in conjunction with her nonselection "because she did not fit
the sexual stereotype of what a woman should be," whereas the plaintiff
at bar "faced no such carping."232 The majority observed that "'[n]ice'
and 'nurturing' are simply not qualities that are stereotypically female.
Any reasonable person of either sex would like to be considered
'nice." 2 33 The court found that it would be
indefensible to conclude that an employer's use of the word "nice"
evinces gender discrimination. Were it so, every time an employer
said, "[Bob or Sue], you are a nice person and a hard worker, but I am
going to have to let you go," such a statement would become a basis for
a Title VII discrimination claim.234
227. 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000).
228. Id. at 37-38.
229. Id at 57.
230. Id. at 43-44.
231. Id. at 44.
232. Id
233. Id.
234. Id.
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The majority even went so far as to go to the dictionary definition of
the word nurture, which is "to supply with food, nourishment, and
,,235protection" and "to train by or as if by instruction. These definitions,
the majority found, "are in no way stereotypically female,"2 36 and wholly
"innocuous words" improperly deemed by the plaintiff to be
"semaphores for discrimination."23 7 Fearful of chilling tenure
committees' prerogative to candidly discuss tenure applicants' "positive
personal attributes," the majority declined to take issue with the238
characterizations. After all, it reasoned, "[n]iceness and nurturing are
not. . . bad qualities to have in a teacher's mentoring capacity-
particularly of undergraduates." 2 39
According to the dissent, however, the record in Weinstock
"reflect[ed] gender discrimination incontrovertibly shown by gender
stereotyping." 24 0 In fact, the dissent argued, the majority's distinction of
the case at bar from Hopkins evinced a logic that "misapprehends why
stereotyping is discriminatory.,241 In fact, as the dissent recited, the very
irony of Hopkins's case stemmed from the fact that her so-called
"masculine qualities" that took her out of contention for partnership
would have been lauded had they been discerned in a male candidate.242
Thus, Hopkins failed to comport with her gender stereotype, resulting in
her illegal ouster. Weinstock's case, according to the dissent, confronted
the court with "the mirror image" of Hopkins, in that the plaintiffs
nonselection was allegedly premised on her perceived success at
projecting a stereotypically 'feminine' image at work."24 3 The case thus
cried out for an application of Hopkins, according to the dissent:
Unfortunately for Weinstock, a stereotypically "feminine" person is not
viewed in a male dominated field as a driven, scientifically-minded,
competitive academic researcher. The inappropriate focus on
Weinstock's "feminine" qualities in the tenure process led ... others to
discount her "masculine" success as a researcher and professor. While
235. Id. (citing WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)).
236. Id. The majority also noted that these terms were used to describe the plaintiffs classroom
performance, and not her research, which was cited by the university as the basis for her denial of
tenure. Id.
237. Id at 45.
238. Id. at 45.
239. Id
240. Id. at 56 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
241. Id at 57.
242. Id
243. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Hopkins was punished for failing to perform a "feminine" role,
Weinstock was punished for performing it too well.
The problem both Weinstock and Hopkins faced is that their
employers demanded that they perform both "masculine" and
"feminine" roles, yet perceived those roles as fundamentally
incompatible. Unlike "masculine" men at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins
was punished because her "masculinity" appeared inconsistent with
gendered stereotypes of how women should look and behave;
Weinstock was punished because her "femininity" appeared
inconsistent with "masculine" success as a researcher. Yet if
Weinstock had chosen to project a more "masculine" image, she could
very well have suffered the same fate as Hopkins.244
The issue of whether an actual stereotype is in play in a given
situation is a threshold issue that ought to be answerable by resort to
Hopkins-the case in which the Supreme Court discussed the
impermissible use of stereotypes and stereotyping.2 45  This issue,
however, broken down, actually involves multiple questions that are
evaluated by courts, albeit often implicitly. Additionally, there is, or at
least there should be, some debate as to whether all of these questions are
even relevant to the query at hand. Among the questions that courts
appear to have considered when resolving the issue of whether or not a
stereotype-expressly articulated or not-was in play include the
following: Does the statement reference an identifiable class, or is it too
vague or ambiguous; is the stereotype an entrenched stereotype,
meaning, is it societally known; is the stereotype adequately voiced, or is
too tacit or implied to be discerned as such; and is the comment or
remark a stereotype that adverts to a characterization of a person based
upon his class, or is it merely an inartful characterization of a trait or
behavior that has no relation to either the plaintiffs protected class or to
the speaker's perception of the class?
1. Does the Stereotype Reference an Identifiable Class?
If a precise, protected class is not discernible as the subject of a
stereotyped belief, it is difficult for the alleged belief viably to buttress a
Title VII claim. 24 6 Sometimes a plaintiff will call upon a court to read
into words or actions to discern that an employer has discriminated
244. Id at 57-58.
245. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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against the plaintiff "because of' protected class membership, despite the
fact that such a link is far from explicit.
In a 2007 district court case, Maturen v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.,
the plaintiffs supervisor told him that he "should learn to control [his]
wife and keep her in her place" after the plaintiffs wife criticized his
employer's store and personnel in an e-mail to the supervisor.247 He sued
after his termination, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by
punishing him for his wife's misdeed and his failure to prevent or
"control" it.24 8 The court, however, observed that "[t]he salient issue in a
Title VII claim of discrimination is whether the plaintiff was singled out
because of his membership in a protected class and treated less favorably
than those outside the class, not whether the plaintiff was treated less
favorably than 'someone's general standard of equitable treatment.' 24 9
Thus, the court found the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim that
he was treated differently because of his sex or, as the court said, show
that any defendant "was motivated by a hostility toward or prejudice
against a protected class."250
It is interesting to note that the court did not specify of whom
"someone's general standard of equitable treatment" refers.251 Is it, in
fact, even the case that "the salient issue in a Title VII claim" will always
be one's having been singled out and treated differently than nonclass
members? When a decision-maker discriminates against certain class
members for acting too much or too little like stereotyped notions of
what the decision-maker thinks the class is or should be, does the
decision-maker confer discriminatory, adverse effects upon protected
class members "because of' their status? 252
This interpretation of Hopkins is questionable and inconsonant with a
well-accepted form of gender discrimination, family responsibility
discrimination (FRD), in which women with children are treated
differently than either men or women without children on the basis of
their sex and stereotyped notions about women as caretakers of
children.253 Virtually every circuit has adopted the notion that FRD
247. No. 06-CV-15126, 2007 WL 3173962, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2007).
248. Id at *6.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REv. 359, 386-96 (2004); Shin,
supra note 36, at 499.
253. See Albiston et al., supra note 43, at 1296-98; Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1369 (2008); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie
Bomstein, The Evolution of "FReD ": Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in
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contravenes Title VII's mandate even though the discrimination does not
systemically discriminate against all women.254 Rather, the
discrimination is recognized as targeting women who happen to be in
certain circumstances. 25 5  The genesis of FRD derives from the courts'
acceptance-and the Supreme Court's having taken judicial notice-of
the fact that women are perceived in society as assuming the
responsibility for caring for children and may resultantly be unjustly
perceived as having fewer resources and less time and capacity for work
outside the home than they would without children.256 While the
recognition and validation of FRD as a cognizable cause of action
premised on an erroneous stereotype is a step toward recognition that
discrimination is nuanced and often able to elude the rigid codification
that federal legislation tends to impose upon it, FRD is one of the few
steps that the law has taken in this direction. FRD does not allege that a
woman has been "singled out because of h[er] membership in a protected
class and treated less favorably than those outside the class," and yet it
forms the basis for a cognizable Title VII lawsuit. 25 7
So why is it that courts should not construe the normative stereotype
that a man should be capable of "controlling" his wife's actions as
disparate treatment "because of sex" when courts presume that the
stereotype that women with children are less capable at work is? The
the Law ofStereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008); Joan C. Williams &
Consuela A. Pinto, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: Don't Get Caught off Guard, 22 LAB.
LAW. 293, 293-95 (2007); see also Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (May
23, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (describing situations in which
disparate treatment of a caregiver may constitute unlawful disparate treatment on the basis of gender
in violation of Title VII because "[e]mployment decisions that discriminate against workers with
caregiving responsibilities are prohibited by Title VII if they are based on sex or another protected
characteristic, regardless of whether the employer discriminates more broadly against all members of
the protected class").
254. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that "[t]he
Supreme Court and several circuits, including this one, have had occasion to confirm that the
assumption that a woman will perform her job less well due to her presumed family obligations is a
form of sex-stereotyping and that adverse job actions on that basis constitute sex discrimination");
Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that sex-stereotyping existed where
decision-maker admitted he did not promote plaintiff "because she had children and he didn't think
she'd want to relocate her family, though she hadn't told him that"); Back v. Hastings on Hudson
Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that "it takes no special training to
discern stereotyping in the view that a woman cannot 'be a good mother' and have a job that requires
long hours, or in the statement that a mother who received tenure 'would not show the same level of
commitment [she] had shown because [she] had little ones at home').
255. See Albiston et al., supra note 43, at 1296-98; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 253, at
1313.
256. See Albiston et al., supra note 43, at 1296-98.
257. See id. at 1285-86; see also Williams & Pinto, supra note 253, at 293-94 (discussing the
development in FRD case law and the different causes of action that can be brought).
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court does not provide an answer to this question. Is it because women
have historically been discriminated against, whereas men have not?
Title VII jurisprudence dictates that men are no less deserving of full
protection under its language than are women.258 Is it because the
alleged stereotype that underlies this case is not as societally
entrenched-meaning as known, accepted, and believed on a widespread
basis-as that which underlies FRD? It ought not matter how well
entrenched a stereotype is, though, if a particular decision-maker
operated under the assumption that a given stereotype was true and then
conferred disparate treatment upon an employee because of protected
class status, notwithstanding the fact that the stereotype was esoteric or
even wholly fabricated by the decision-maker.2 59
No good reason seems to explain why the thinking that "you are a
man who cannot control his wife, therefore not the 'right' kind of man,
and therefore will suffer an adverse action," is not, if proven to be the
thinking at issue, discrimination because of sex. It may represent
intraclass discrimination, but so does FRD, and so does the stereotyping
in Hopkins. Unless being perceived as the wrong kind of woman only
violates Title VII when the woman is seen as too manly or too womanly,
no reason exists to explain why the above train of thought should not
violate Title VII.
Moreover, the court in Maturen went on to note that even if the
alleged attitude at issue were to be construed as a variety of sex
discrimination, "[a]t most, Plaintiff has averred facts that demonstrate
that the store manager held a chauvinistic view that men should control
their wives' behavior and that, since Plaintiff was unable to do so, he did
not live up to the store manager's conception of masculinity" because
"the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the [Hopkins] theory as inapplicable to
scenarios where the 'gender non-conforming behavior . .. is not behavior
observed at work or affecting his job performance.' 26 0
This stance similarly makes no sense in the larger context of Title
VII and its broad remedial goal of .'strik[ing] at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
258. See Albiston et al., supra note 43, at 1300-01 (noting that FRD claims brought by men are
potentially meritorious when decision-makers penalize men who fail to conform to the male
breadwinner stereotype); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 253, at 1320-21 (discussing how men,
as well as women, are affected by FRD and how "[m]en as well as women are successfully suing for
FRD").
259. See McGinley, supra note 180, at 474-75.
260. Maturen v. Lowe's Home Ctrs, Inc., No. 06-CV-15126, 2007 WL 3173962, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 26, 2007).
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stereotypes."' 26 1 If gender nonconforming behavior is not observed in
the workplace but is still used as the basis for a workplace-related
consequence, it is certainly no less an action taken "because of'
protected class status than it would be if the behavior were discernible at
work. If anything, using behavior that does not bear upon performance
at work as the basis for an adverse action would be inherently more
indicative of irrational prejudice than relying on workplace behavior to
form the basis for evaluations and consequences.
In Moren v. Progress Energy, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was
harassed because of the perception that he was "a particular kind of
man." 262 The court found this allegation vague and cryptic but hazarded
a guess that his claim meant that he felt that he was perceived as
homosexual.263 The court distinguished Hopkins from the case before it,
observing that
the discrimination in Hopkins was based on gender stereotyping, that is,
stereotyping based on feminine characteristics that are traditionally
associated with women. Hopkins was not perceived as feminine;
rather, she was perceived as masculine. The Court stated that "[t]here
were clear signs . .. that some of the partners reacted negatively to
Hopkins' [masculine] personality because she was a woman." In light
of this analytical framework, a claim under Title VII could be stated if
Moren was able to show that the harassment he allegedly suffered was
based on his perceived failure to conform to a masculine gender role.
Moren, however, cannot.264
Again, because the plaintiff could not show that his "behavior at
work ... [was] reasonably perceived as feminine, and, therefore, as that
of a homosexual," the court found that his claim could not survive.2 65
It is important to note that numerous cases in which a homosexual
plaintiff alleged a failure to comport with the gender stereotypes of a
decision-maker, courts have erected what many scholars believe to be an
artificial bifurcation between cases involving sex discrimination and
cases involving sexual orientation discrimination.266 By stating that
261. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting City of L.A. Dep't of
Water& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
262. No. 8:07-cv-1676-T-17, 2008 WL 3243860, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7,2008).
263. Id.
264. Id (quoting Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235) (citation omitted).
265. Id at *5-6.
266. See generally Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 205 (2007); Ryan M. Martin, Return
to Gender: Finding a Middle Ground in Sex Stereotyping Claims Involving Homosexual Plaintiffs
Under Title VII, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 371 (2006); Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se:
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gender stereotypes are not in play, but homosexual animus is, courts are
able to clear their dockets of these cases without acknowledging that
such animus is nearly always bound up in or at least accompanied by
disappointment that one has not conformed to her traditional gender role.
This practice has served systemically to disadvantage homosexual
plaintiffs.
2. Is the Stereotype Entrenched?
Must a stereotype be entrenched or societally known or accepted
before it is deemed evidence of discrimination that could so much as
raise a triable issue of fact and stave off a grant of summary judgment?
While the case law on point would seem to indicate that the answer is
yes, a more searching look into how and why an individual comment is
used by a speaker to stereotype an employee would seem to be the best
indicator that the alleged class-based discrimination did, in fact, go on.
To the extent that stereotypes can create an inference of
discrimination,267 an individual alleged stereotype should be shown to
inhere in the mind of the decision-maker. But need it be established in
the outside world?
In Love v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC, the plaintiff alleged that she had
been the victim of gender stereotyping in the form of complaints that she
did not conform to her supervisor's "idea of a liberated, physically fit
woman" or of a "slimmer, liberated woman."268 The court rejected this
claim, finding that someone's idea of a "liberated, physically fit woman
by definition cannot constitute a stereotype, which is based on society's
general ideas about traits commonly thought to be shared by persons of
the same physical type."2 69  The court noted that "[w]hatever
[someone's] individual ideas may have been about women's liberation
and physical appearance, these do not constitute gender stereotypes."270
Comparing the case at issue to Hopkins, the court observed that "Hopkins
Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561 (2007); Maurice Wexler & Angela
Davis, Transexualism, Sex Stereotyping, and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Staircase to Paradise
or a Slippery Slope?, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 41 (2005).
267. See Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2009) ("When employment decisions
are based on invidious sex stereotypes, a reasonable jury could infer the existence of discriminatory
intent"); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)
("[Clomments made about a woman's inability to combine work and motherhood are direct evidence
of [sex] discrimination.").
268. No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *9 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008).
269. Id at*10.
270. Id. The court added, "at least not as such stereotypes have been recognized among the
circuits in sexual stereotyping harassment claims." Id.
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involved the general belief that women should be meeker than men (i.e.
not 'liberated')." 2 7 1 Therefore, the court rejected the notion that there
was any legal significance behind the allegation that this plaintiff failed
to conform to the image of one who was too liberated.272
Moreover, the court found that this case failed to "fit the mold" of an
actionable same-sex sexual stereotyping harassment claim because while
the plaintiff alleged that she had been stereotyped for failing to comport
herself as a woman should, she never claimed that she had been harassed
for acting too much like a man or having male mannerisms. 2 73 This, the
court held, was fatal to her claim.274
In this case, the allegation made-construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and presumed to be true, as per the summary
judgment standard-was that the plaintiff was not the "right type of
woman" insofar as the decision-maker conceptualized the way in which
women should appear.275 In that sense, this may be considered a gender
stereotype. The court, however, refused to deem this a gender stereotype
that might raise an inference of gender discrimination because it was not
a "general belief," which may refer to a societally entrenched belief
about the conception or idealization of women, as was found in
Hopkins. 276
Ostensibly, the question of how entrenched the stereotype is should
not be relevant, so long as it inheres in the decision-maker's mind.
Stereotypes are nefarious because of the mindset they evince; that
mindset is subjective and should not need societal reinforcement to be
valid evidence of animus, prejudice, or misperception that may have
precipitated class-based disparate treatment. Moreover, whether the
stereotype invoked goes toward the woman being "too manly" ought not
be the dispositive question as to whether she can prove sex
discrimination. To the extent any decision-maker is inclined to see a
protected class ideal in a certain way and then judges a protected class
member in a way in which he would not judge a non-class member for
failing to conform to this ideal, the class member experiences
discrimination on the basis of class status.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. (noting that "all the circuit cases recognizing same-sex sexual stereotyping claims have
involved harassment of men for having feminine traits or mannerisms, or women for having male
traits or mannerisms").
275. Id. at *9-10.
276. Id. at *10. As a separate matter, she was not, as Ann Hopkins was, found to be too much
like a man, but rather the "wrong type" of woman. Id
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3. Was the Stereotype Explicit or Too Tacit or "Inartful" to Evince
Prejudice?
If a plaintiff is fortunate, she will have an expressed, explicit
stereotyped comment to buttress her assertion that she was adversely
affected by the stereotyped beliefs of others and the employer thus acted
on the basis of her protected class status. For example, in a 2009 district
court case, the plaintiff claimed that she was the victim of gender
stereotyping after she was told, following her nonselection for a
Customer Relationship Manager (CRM) program, that she needed to be
"more motherly, soft, and kind, rather than aggressive, strong, and
arrogant. 277 The defendants maintained that they chose not to select the
plaintiff on the basis of her interview, emphasizing that she "admit[ted]
that [another candidate] had better performance appraisals than she did,
was outstanding, and was more qualified for the CRM position" and that
the plaintiff testified that "she was not more qualified than" others. 27 8 As
the court recited, it was "the defendants' position that Casella was
officially turned down for the CRM position based on her
'Communication,' defined, in part, as a candidate who did not
demonstrate an ability to speak clearly and answer questions succinctly;
they selected candidates who were able to more fully respond to
,,279questions.
The plaintiff, however, contended that "all of the female candidates
with whom she was familiar and who were selected fit the stereotype of
being soft and non-aggressive."280 She pointed out that when she
questioned a decision-maker as to "why she was not selected, he told her
that she was 'too cocky,' 'overly arrogant,' that she should not be 'so
aggressive' and 'strong' and that she reminded him of himself."2 8 1
Another decision-maker told her "that he had heard she was turned down
because she was 'cocky and arrogant and aggressive' and that she
'needed to become more softer [sic], more motherly; that if [she] was a
man, it was acceptable, it's not acceptable out of a woman and that we
need to address it."' 2 82 A non-decision-maker gave the plaintiff "an
overview of the evolution of women in business and told [her] that today
277. Casella v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., No. 8-176-B-W, 2009 WL 1621411, at *1 (D. Me. June
9, 2009).
278. Id. at *14.
279. Id.
280. Id
281. Id.at*14n.24.
282. Id
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'women are actually looked at as mothers, that they need to be a little
softer, a little kinder ... more motherly."' 28 3 This individual also told
her to "take the Myers-Briggs' instrument,... so that she [could] look at
her personality and see what she could do to change her personality and
to get it in line with what the Bank expects of a female manager, to be
more motherly and soft."28 4 She was told, after her interview, "that she
'scared him' and was 'very aggressive' and 'came on very strong."'
285
Moreover, the court noted, "[n]one of the individuals whom Casella
spoke to about why she did not get selected said anything to her about
'communication."' 2
86
The court found that the plaintiff had adduced enough evidence of
discrimination to warrant a denial of summary judgment. 28 7  As in
Hopkins, the statements made to the plaintiff were explicit to such an
extent that any legitimate concerns that the defendants may have had
about traits or skills unrelated to the plaintiffs gender were eclipsed by
the articulated beliefs about women and the type of woman that the
plaintiff was. 2 88 As the court said, "at summary judgment [the court
does] not decide which explanation for the non-promotion is most
convincing, but only whether [the plaintiff] has presented sufficient
evidence regarding [his or] her explanation."2 89
Often, however, although the same sentiments may be lurking
beneath the surface of the plaintiffs interactions with decision-makers,
they are left unarticulated, partially articulated, or even coded, such that
they are not discernible as stereotyped beliefs. In a 2007 district court
case, the plaintiff, a Hispanic female, alleged that that her "style of
communication" was perceived as "aggressive and inflammatory," which
she claimed were "stereotyped characterizations that are often used when
women and people of color are self-confident, intelligent and
assertive." 290  She argued that the defendant's position that she was
difficult-"reacting quickly and negatively in her interactions with co-
workers" and responding to co-workers in an "angry and defensive"
manner-only served to illustrate her employer's "application of a
283. Id.
284. Id. at *17.
285. Id. at *14 n.24.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *27.
288. Id. at *22-24.
289. Id. at *1 (quoting Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 47 n.l 1 (1st Cir. 2009)).
290. Valles-Hall v. Ctr. for Nonprofit Advancement, 481 F. Supp. 2d 118, 132 (D.D.C. 2007).
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double-standard and stereotyping of [her]." 2 9' The only explicit
reference that a supervisor had made to her race was a comment that "[i]f
making judgments about people and telling them is a cultural thing, then
maybe we should tell the staff it's a cultural thing and they should buck
up and take it." 292 This same supervisor, however, informed the plaintiff
that she deemed her "behavior not to be 'a cultural thing' but rather to be
'verbal abuse."' 29 3
The court, however, refused to consider the comments direct
evidence of discrimination, dismissing it instead as "an uninformed and
insensitive statement regarding Plaintiffs ethnicity or national origin, but
not an intentionally discriminatory statement." 29 4 It was, "[a]t most,...
a stray remark that, although probative of discrimination, cannot serve as
direct evidence of discrimination." 29 5  The court granted summary
judgment on her claim, 29 6 concluding that in terms of evidence as to the
stereotyped belief, the plaintiff had furnished "only her own speculation
that [the supervisor's] reaction . .. demonstrated racial bias."297
The court's failure to marry the remark that it deemed "probative of
discrimination" with the allegation of unarticulated or coded racial bias
proved fatal to the claim.298 Maintaining that the plaintiff proffered only
her own speculation seems to run counter to the court's admission that
the remark it dismissed as "stray" was probative of discrimination. This
evinces its failure to merge the idea of a nexus between the underlying
bias alleged and the lens through which the plaintiff s character traits and
alleged foibles were seen. Even as the court acknowledged the potential
of the remark to be probative of discrimination, it refused to incorporate
the discrimination into the larger picture of the alleged stereotyped
belief, absent "direct evidence." 2 9 9 "Direct evidence," however, as the
courts have defined it, usually means an explicit, smoking gun, as seen in
Casella.oo In light of how easy it is to mask, code, or simply not express
291. Id. at 132, 147,150.
292. Id at 132.
293. Id.
294. Id
295. Id. at 141.
296. Id at 152.
297. Id. at 150.
298. Id. at 141.
299. Id
300. See supra notes 277-89 and accompanying text. The court in Valles-Hall stated that, "at a
minimum, direct evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace, particularly those made
by nondecision-makers or statements made by decision-makers unrelated to the decisional process
itself." Valles-Hall, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (quoting Brady v. Livingood, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2006)).
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such damning sentiments, it would seem likely to be fatal to many
legitimate stereotyping claims to require a "smoking gun" beyond a
statement that the court admitted had some probative value simply for
the case to survive summary judgment.
The lesson to be learned from stereotyping allegations, though, is
that in most cases, voiced words matter. The articulation of words rather
than mere allusions or implicit references to ideas or images will
typically be critical to the outcome of a determination, even if the
unarticulated sentiments actually lurk beneath the surface.301
Sometimes, however, courts will give enough credence to an
allegation of stereotyping where comments have been far less than
explicit. In a Ninth Circuit case, the plaintiff alleged that gender
stereotyping had tainted the decision to lay her off.3 02 She said that "her
supervisor would rarely hear women in staff meetings and gave her
inferior work assignments" and that her supervisor told her that others
found her "pushy and aggressive."303 The court noted that the plaintiff
understood these remarks to mean her supervisor found her "pushy and
aggressive for a woman." 3  The court thus concluded:
Sexual stereotyping, as possibly indicated by such remarks, can serve
as evidence that gender played a role in the employer's decision. While
her supervisor's comments might not have been as blatant as the sex
stereotypes in [Hopkins], the subjective nature of the skills matrix-
prepared specifically for the workforce reduction-left ample room for
such stereotypes to affect [her] scores, especially in areas such as
"leadership" and "teamwork" where aggressiveness by a female might
be impermissibly penalized. 305
This, combined with the plaintiffs testimony about the shortcomings of
a comparator who did not meet her fate, led the court to decline to grant
summary judgment on the plaintiffs case. 06
In other cases, even the presence of a word or phrase that adverts
indirectly to a gendered or racial stereotype has been enough to surmount
301. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot justify
requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate
criteria." (citation omitted)).
302. Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 F. App'x 138, 139 (9th Cir. 2002).
303. Id. at 141.
304. Id.
305. Id (citation omitted).
306. Id. at 141-42; see also Sullivan, supra note 119, at 237 ("[T]he grant of summary judgment
or the ultimate finding with respect to discrimination will also depend not merely on one comparator
plus expert witness but rather on what other evidence both sides are able to adduce.").
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the summary judgment hurdle. It is interesting to examine which words
can catapult a case over the hurdle when the alleged stereotyped belief is
otherwise tacit. In Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, the
plaintiff was told by a partner for whom she worked that he "'could not
talk to her' and was uncomfortable with her." 307 He later told her that
"the partners thought she was 'difficult' and that she had not expressed
enough gratitude for her raise."308 When she asked the partner for help in
her interactions with a paralegal that she found uncooperative, "he told
her that she was not 'sweet' enough and needed to use more 'sugar' with
any paralegal who was uncooperative."30 9 The court found that "a
reasonable jury could find that [the] statement indicates that (1) he holds
stereotypes that women should be 'sweet' and non-aggressive, and (2)
that [the partner] believed that Plaintiff did not fit this stereotype."310
Therefore, the court found, the remark could support a factual finding
that the defendant's "failure to provide Plaintiff with sufficient work was
motivated by Plaintiffs failure to fulfill sex stereotypes of 'sweetness,"'
and amounted to unlawful discrimination. 3 11 The court found the remark
especially probative because the partner was the defendant's managing
partner and worked closely with the plaintiff regarding her work
312requests.
Similarly, in Kahn v. Fairfield University, the defendant deemed the
plaintiff to have a problem with her communication style, personality,
and work style.3 13 The plaintiff had been the subject of staff complaints
about her "overbearing work style and her habit of requiring staff entitled
to overtime to work without compensation for extra hours."314 Others
reported feeling "condescended to or lectured to or felt in some way ...
told what to do or felt in some way belittled" and believing that the
plaintiff lacked "the courtesy of listening." 3 15 At meetings, committee
members reported feeling that she was "'arrogant'-that she would
follow through on her own agenda regardless of whether or not she had
departmental or faculty support."316
307. No. 04 CV 8983(KMW)(MHD), 2008 WL 2971668, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008).
308. Id.
309. Id at *9.
310. Id
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 357 F. Supp. 2d 496, 504 (D. Conn. 2005).
314. Id. at 505.
315. Id.
316. Id at 506.
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The court noted that "[s]uch characteristics might be considered
positive, leadership traits. On the other hand, they might be considered
flaws that make a person a less effective administrator. In context, they
may also be considered improper gender stereotypes." The court went
on to find that the "conclusory statements that Kahn was 'arrogant' or
'difficult to work with"' were baseless and proved largely
unsubstantiated when the speakers were questioned about the remarks.3 18
Thus, the court found, "[g]iven the imprecise nature of the University's
purported legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the evidence provided
by Kahn to support a factual finding of pretext is sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment."3 19
Additionally, in cases where evidence shows that gendered or racial
slurs or derogation have invaded the workplace, even in a generalized
manner, courts are more likely to connect the environment rife with
stereotyped beliefs to specific adverse actions allegedly motivated by
stereotyped beliefs. For example, in Lake v. AK Steel Corp., the district
court found that a rational juror could conclude that a system put into
place to monitor the plaintiff while at work was prompted by
"unsubstantiated and unverifiable rumors ... indicative of a consistent
theme in the work place graffiti that African American workers were
lazy, untrustworthy and undeserving of a job."32 0  The district court
reiterated the premise that an "action taken against a minority employee
based on negative stereotyping can be construed by the finder of fact as
evidence of discriminatory treatment because of race."32 1 The district
court also found that the plaintiff had been accused of theft and
disciplined based on similar, unfounded stereotypical inferences about
him drawn by decision-makers.322 However, evidence of substantial
disparate treatment in this case compounded the evidence of racial
stereotyping.323 In any event, whether a remark is reflective of a mindset
that attributes negative qualities to class members is an important
question bound up in the larger question of how probative a stereotyped
comment is.
3 17. Id.
318. Id. The court also noted: "For example, Committee member Katherine Schwab, Associate
Professor of Art History, when asked to explain why she found working with Kahn 'frustrating,'
could point only to Kahn's requests that Schwab gather information regarding her department in
only a few days, usually less than a week."' Id.
319. Id.
320. No. 2:03CV517, 2006 WL 1158610, at *29 (W.D. Pa. May 1,2006).
321. Id.
322. Id. at *30.
323. Id at *32.
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Although the rationale given as to why some of these cases ran afoul
of Title VII-that a decision somehow informed by stereotyping had
affected a protected class member-is vague, something much more
capable of precise articulation was clearly going on in each case. In each
case, a protected class member had been held to a different-typically
higher-standard because of his or her protected class status than
someone situated outside the class. To the extent that the plaintiffs
failure to meet the different standard resulted in an adverse action that
would not have befallen one situated outside the class, a disparate impact
of sorts was engendered.32 4
4. Is the Comment Merely an Inartful Characterization of a Trait that
Has No Relation to Class Status?
In other cases, courts have found that the comment merely showed
that the decision-maker disfavored a plaintiff s personal trait independent
of the plaintiffs protected class. In Cuttino v. Genesis Health Ventures,
Inc., the plaintiff was terminated for what the court deemed a legitimate
reason.325 The plaintiff, however, contended that although no explicit
comments about her race were ever made by anyone at work, she had
been targeted for particularly bad treatment because of her status as "an
assertive African-American employee."32 6 Her supervisor's poor view of
her skills and performance, the plaintiff maintained, was "tainted" by the
supervisor's "discriminatory attitude towards assertive African-
Americans." 32 7 As proof of this, the plaintiff offered a letter authored by
the supervisor that characterized her as "violent and insubordinate," as
well as "aggressive and intimidating," words that the plaintiff felt were
"stereotypical terms for race discrimination."32 8
The district court, however, refused to find that the letter evinced a
discriminatory attitude, and it drew attention to the fact that the employer
324. See generally Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121
(1998) (contrasting actionable discrimination with de minimis discrimination, which receives little
attention from courts).
325. No. 3:04 CV 575(MRK), 2006 WL 62833, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2006). The court cited
the plaintiff's "lack of understanding of fundamental accounting and booking practices, and her
history of bookkeeping and training errors, the most recent of which ... led the financials to
incorrectly show bad debt, and her failure to train the bookkeeper and oversee proper accounting for
residents' funds." Id.
326. Id. at *5.
327. Id.
328. Id. at *5-6.
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replaced the plaintiff with another African American employee.3 29  The
district court found that words like "lying" and "violent," standing alone,
were not "racial code words." 3 30  This, combined with the fact that the
plaintiff had an admitted "strong, assertive personality that might come
across as intimidating," as well as an admitted "personality conflict" with
her supervisor, meant that the description-apt or not-did not permit
the court to deny summary judgment on the claims.3 31
Indeed, the problem with unarticulated or even partially articulated
stereotypes is one of proof. If a plaintiff like Cuttino could demonstrate
that traits that she possessed were not tolerated as well in her as they
would be in one who was not a member of her protected class, she
should certainly have a cognizable claim of race discrimination.
Moreover, if she could show that a decision-maker was more prone to
discerning or ascribing certain traits to her than he would be to one who
was not a member of her protected class (in this case, race), she should
certainly have a cause of action. However, demonstrating these things
without a smoking gun-an explicit statement or comment that
references her protected class-would be incredibly difficult.3 2 Many
courts have found that without comparators,333 or even with potential, but
not perfect, comparators,3 34 the absence of a smoking gun comment is
fatal to a plaintiff s claim.
Once it has been established that there is a stereotype in play, courts
go on to ascertain whether a tenable connection exists between the
stereotype and the adverse action at issue. The bulk of this Article
focuses on stereotypes themselves and fleshing out and evaluating the
329. Id at *6.
330. Id
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, Milwaukee, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d
809, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("The EEOC ... claims that passing over Johnson for the ... position
was . . . on account of Johnson's race. This claim is grounded primarily in [a] belief that Johnson
was too aggressive. The EEOC claims that this reliance on aggressiveness amounts to impermissible
stereotyping. While it is possible that such is true, the EEOC proffers no evidence that Jurishica was
engaging in racial stereotyping in this respect.").
333. See Sullivan, supra note 119, at 192 ("Thus, only when those factors are ruled out by an
almost-twin comparator will the courts permit the inference of discrimination.").
334. See, e.g., Blue v. Def. Logistics Agency, 181 F. App'x 272, 273 (3d Cir. 2006) ("To
establish a prima facie case ... a plaintiff must show ... non-members of the protected class were
treated more favorably."); Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 243 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring the
plaintiff to discuss comparison group as part of the direct evidence); see also Sullivan, supra note
119, at 208 (citing several cases where not being able to produce a comparator was fatal to the
plaintiff's claim). But see EEOC v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759, 764 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(finding that failure to show similar treatment of comparable, nonpregnant employees was not fatal
to the plaintiffs case).
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questions embedded in discerning whether the alleged "stereotyping"
evinces something actionable. However, once a stereotype that can
evince discrimination is discerned, it is important to examine the
questions bound up in this next part of the analysis.
B. Was There a Proper Nexus Between the Stereotype and the
Harassment or Adverse Action or Change in Terms and Conditions?
In Zhao v. State University of New York, the plaintiff sued her
employer for national-origin discrimination in violation of Title VII. 33 s
In the course of attempting to demonstrate the existence of this
discrimination, Zhao proffered what she deemed to be a stereotyped
comment made by one of her interviewers, Dr. Batuman, that "she liked
to employ Chinese people because they work very hard and very long
hours." Zhao alleged that once she was hired, this same decision-
maker commented that she was not in the laboratory enough and
questioned the commitment that a recommender had attributed to her.3 37
She also alleged, among other things, that this same individual "told a
story about her Chinese babysitter's husband," insisted that she be in the
lab such that she became wary of taking restroom or lunch breaks, denied
her library privileges, humiliated her by mocking her heavy accent, and
at a party attended by some Turkish guests, asked her "whether she
though[t] Turkish people are 'more lovely' than Chinese people."338
Moreover, Zhao pointed to what she saw as a "lack of resources and
staffing in the laboratory," which she blamed on Dr. Batuman's
"unrealistically high expectations regarding her performance based on
ethnic stereotyping of individuals of Chinese origin." 3 39
The district court denied the employer's motion for summary
judgment, citing, among other things, Dr. Batuman's comments at the
time she hired Zhao, which, the district court said, "reflect[ed] that she
may have higher performance expectations for individuals of Chinese
origin because of her belief in certain ethnic stereotypes."340 These
statements, said the district court, "combined with . . other
statements . .. relating to Dr. Zhao's national origin and also that Dr.
Batuman may have imposed work requirements and expectations that
335. 472 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
336. Id at 308.
337. Id at 302.
338. Id at 302-03, 308-09.
339. Id at 309.
340. Id
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would not have been imposed on a non-Chinese employee," furnished a
basis in fact for the conclusion at which a reasonable jury could arrive-
that Zhao had been the victim of national-origin discrimination.3 41
The district court observed that both the circuit in which it was
situated-the Second Circuit-and the Supreme Court had both held that
"decisions resulting from 'stereotyped' impressions or assumptions about
the characteristics or abilities of women violate Title VII." 34 2 The court
noted: "These same principles undoubtedly apply with equal force to
racial and ethnic stereotyping," even in a case where "[t]he stereotyping
involved positive attributes that could have initially favored a plaintiff at
the time of hiring."343 Indeed, the district court found:
If an employer has crossed the line into making employment decisions
based on ethnic stereotyping rather than on the merits, one could easily
see how a stereotype that may benefit an employee on one day could
result in an adverse employment action on another day. This type of
stereotyping in employment decisions, if proven is precisely the type
of evil that Title VII is designed to prevent ... .
Thus, the fact that Dr. Batuman drew upon so-called positive
stereotyping of Chinese people as hardworking engendered an adverse
effect when Zhao fell short of the unrealistically high expectations that
Dr. Batuman set for her. Ultimately, the court held:
If it is demonstrated that an employer is making any employment
decisions based upon these impermissible stereotypes and an employee
subsequently suffers an adverse employment action that potentially
implicates such stereotypes, a jury may reasonably infer that the
adverse employment action resulted from the impermissible
stereotypin as opposed to the proffered non-discriminatory reason for
the action.
While this case illustrates the notion that a person can be considered "not
enough like" her class and made to suffer for it, the assumptions in this
case were explicitly stated.
Again, this case demonstrates that there are multiple questions and
issues bound up in the larger question of whether a stereotype-once
identified as such-actually operated to motivate a change to the terms
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 310.
344. Id.
345. Id
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or conditions of a plaintiffs employment, thus rendering the plaintiff
discriminated against on the basis of her protected class status. Among
the questions that courts have weighed or should weigh while addressing
this larger question are whether the remark was made by a decision-
maker or one to whom no authority was conferred, whether the remark
was made in ample temporal proximity to the decision, and whether the
remark was made in reference to the employment decision at issue.
These questions will be briefly addressed here, but they turn upon
considerations that differ substantially from those that surround the
notion of stereotyping.34 6
1. Was the Remark Made by a Decision-Maker?
The question of who uttered the allegedly discriminatory remark is
and should be important to courts trying to ascertain whether an adverse
employment action was motivated by discrimination.3 47 In a 2009
district court case, the plaintiffs supervisor commented that "[w]omen
are good for only one thing and that is sex" and that "he wanted to get rid
of two older employees because they were 'too old to do their jobs well
anymore."' 3 48 The court judged the case to be "indistinguishable" from
Hopkins:
Like the Policy Board, the decision makers here, while unbiased
themselves, took into account factors allegedly tainted by sexism in
making an adverse employment decision. The court, of course,
recognizes that the incident leading to Lanahan's termination was
investigated and acted upon by unbiased decision makers. However,
the court cannot ignore evidence that the decision makers also
implicitly relied on Boyd's disciplinary actions in deciding to terminate
Lanahan.349
346. These questions will be the central subject of a future article.
347. Thus, the court considered whether the decision-makers made the remark. Courts have used
the "cat's paw" theory to "aid[] them in determining when an employer should be liable for an
adverse employment decision that may have been 'tainted by a biased subordinate employee."' Sara
Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw? Independent Investigations and the Cat's
Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 146 (2008) (quoting Angelo J. Genova & Francis J.
Vemoia, Litigating Employment Discrimination Claims 2007, in LITIGATION, at 9, 20-21 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 10836, 2007)); cf Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for
Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40
CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1163 n.211 (2008) ("The courts have even adopted the cat's paw theory in
circumstances where a subordinate or peer-level employee expresses bias that influences the ultimate
decision-maker.").
348. Lanahan v. S. Nev. Health Dist., No. 2:06CV-01176-LRH-LRL, 2009 WL 395794, at *2
(D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2009).
349. Id. at *7.
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2. Was the Remark Made in Ample Temporal Proximity to the
Decision?
Numerous courts have evaluated the length of time that elapsed
between the comment made and the adverse employment action at issue
to determine whether the action was motivated by discriminatory intent
evinced by the comment. The range of elapsed times contemplated,
however, has varied from court to court.350
3. Was the Remark Made in Reference to the Employment Decision at
Issue?
All too often, courts foreclose a plaintiffs case by granting summary
judgment to a defendant when the plaintiff proffers a stereotyped
comment indicative of a discriminatory mindset but the comment was
not specifically made in reference to the particular adverse decision at
issue.
In Boyd v. State Farm Insurance Cos., the plaintiff claimed that his
employer failed to promote him based on his race.35  The employer
relied on a performance evaluation to justify its decision not to promote
the plaintiff, and the evaluation had been prepared by the plaintiffs
supervisor, who, evidence showed, called the plaintiff "Buckwheat" and
a "Porch Monkey."352 However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, dismissing these
comments as stray remarks without a "causal connection" to the specific
failure to promote.3 53
Indeed, several courts have expressed that "when assessing the
ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the court may properly
disregard any stray remarks made by the decisionmaker but not causally
related to the decisionmaking process."3 54 Such disregard often results in
350. Compare Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting "a long time
period between a remark and an employment action can defeat the inference of a 'causal nexus
between the remark and the decision to discharge' but holding that a three-to-four-month period of
time did not sever the nexus between the intent shown and the adverse action at issue), with Geier v.
Medtronic Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (not weighing evidence of discriminatory intent
that occurred a year before the adverse action).
351. 158 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1998).
352. Id. at 329-30.
353. Id at 330.
354. Engstrand v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1390, 1399 (S.D. Iowa 1996); see
also Ortiz-Rivera v. Astra Zeneca LP, 363 F. App'x 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that probativeness
of stray remarks "is circumscribed if they were not related to the employment decision in question"
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a grant of summary judgment that precludes the question of
discrimination-the ultimate question-from getting before a trier.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases of Sassaman and Lautermilch, both discussed very early
on in this Article,5 are perfectly illustrative of the confusion in the law
about when an alleged "stereotyped" comment suffices as evidence that
can buttress a discrimination claim. Both cases involved men, a class
that people do not traditionally associate with warranting protection
under Title VII or with utilizing the statute to vindicate rights. Both
cases also involved verbal expressions that reflected certain beliefs, but
the extent to which those beliefs about an individual are more broadly
moored in class-based animus or an attitude that could foment class-
based disparate treatment is more subject to interpretation. That different
federal judges came to radically different conclusions in the course of
evaluating each case illustrates that reasonable minds can differ on such
issues. The relationship of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to a proper
construction of the meaning of comments in each case and their possible
legal significance is, at best, unclear and tenuous.
The fact remains, however, that class-based stereotyping and animus
remain in the modem workplace. These attitudes are too often belied by
the careful phrasing and censoring in which so many engage to comply
with the prohibitions against discrimination set forth by the law and
companies' policies. If a plaintiff is fortunate enough to have evidence
of a so-called stereotyped comment, a court's dismissing it too readily as
a slip of the tongue or as something that as a matter of law could not be
construed as evincing discrimination, thwarts the goals of federal
antidiscrimination law.
Several comments on the ABA's website in response to the article
about the alienation and stereotyping of female attorneys of color-
foremost among them, "Why turn the fact [that] the 75% of minority
females are quitters [sic] into a race issue"356 pitomize the dangerous
mindset that illustrates why stereotyped comments in the workplace are
often far more nefarious than many judges have acknowledged and why
more, not less, vigilance at the summary judgment stage of litigation on
issues of discriminatory intent is needed. Many of the comments
(quoting Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2001))).
355. See supra Part IIA-B.
356. Larry, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009 2:05 PM).
357. Weiss, supra note 163.
656 [Vol. 59
CLARIFYING STEREOTYPING
evince a refusal to accept that all employees do not navigate the
professional world on an equal footing at the outset-"I don't give a
damn what color skin you are. It's 2009. Either give me 2,400 in
billables or go work at McDonalds" 358 -or a resigned acceptance of a
certain amount of discrimination-"if you want ot [sic] see real
discrimiination, [sic] look back 50 years. Nothing today compares; now
it's just about hurt feelings. BFD," and "'Asian-American women
reported stereotypes about being subservient or willing to work nonstop.'
Isn't this expected from every attorney!? Talk about over sensitive." 35 9
Others, however, try to make the point that this is not at all the case:
Big law is a frat house for the good old white boys. . .where you're the
first person of color that many of these attorneys have dealt with other
than their nanny or maid. They all assume that you were only hired as
a diversity charity case as no person of color could ever be as qualified,360if not more qualified as a white person.
In order to combat stereotyping in decision-makers' thoughts and
actions properly, however, courts must consider how easily decision-
makers can mask or mute discriminatory stereotypes that seep into their
thoughts or motives. Decades of needless confusion surround the issue
of stereotyping, attributable in large part to courts' overreliance on a
single case whose unique facts obscured the rationales for guarding
against stereotyping in the first place. The quest for an interpretation,
often bereft of a context, and overreliance on Hopkins without resort to
the true reasons that stereotyped comments and beliefs are suspect in the
context of Title VII have convinced too many judges that summary
judgment is appropriate when state of mind or intent is legitimately
placed at issue by so-called "stray" comments.
Discrimination, like any other state of mind, is elusive, nuanced, and
extremely difficult to prove without a smoking gun. The comments
posted on the ABA website highlight the discrimination female attorneys
of color face and make it clear that race and sex-based discrimination is
alive and well in professional America.
To the extent that stereotyped comments belie deep-seated animus
harbored on any level of consciousness, it is more important than ever
that that rare bits of evidence be given consideration by a trier of fact. In
response to some of the more offensive comments on the website, one
358. Larry, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009 2:05 PM).
359. Hadley v. Baxendale, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 24, 2009 8:30 AM).
360. Esq, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 23, 2009 3:25 PM).
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(presumably) female attorney of color shot back: "Try walking in my
heels for about 5 years at a law office-after you have risen above all the
other negative stereotypes in the general public-and you'll know what it
feels like." Inasmuch as the inability to empathize with others
differently situated, to interpret words as the speaker intended them
without filtering them through one's own presumptions and beliefs, and
to accord proper weight to the roots and shadows of bias that may or may
not be fully expressed permeates our society, cases involving stereotyped
comments must be viewed with an eye toward the real reasons why
stereotypes in the workplace are suspect and the manifold ways in which
they engender disparate treatment. If courts cannot do this adequately,
they will prematurely foreclose plaintiffs' cases at the summary
judgment stage and systemically harm employment discrimination
plaintiffs.
361. Native New Yorker, Comment to Weiss, supra note 163 (July 22, 2009 12:01 PM).
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